The point of departure in this paper is the question of why the Europeanization has been so slow in the Balkans. There are several reasons of why Europeanization process is lagging in the Balkans. These reasons are briefly discussed below. However, because of limitations to the scope, this paper will only focus on one of them. It is argued that one of the reasons of slow Europeanization in the Balkans is the less effectiveness of EU external governance. The argument will be substantiated by analyzing few challenges which the EU faced in the Balkans, but it did not react effectively. Firstly, discussions will focus on the faces of Europeanization and the concept of ‘wider Europe’. After analyzing five faces of Europeanization, redefinition of Europeanization will be presented. Then, the discussions will move on to ‘new neighbourhood, shifts in challenges, expectations and perceptions, and increased interdependence between the EU and third countries. Further, EU external governance and ways of measuring its effectiveness will be addressed. One of the novelties of this paper is the differentiation between EU external governance and EU rule transfer which is widely used as synonyms. After providing appropriate theoretical framework, EU external governance in the Balkans will be subject to analysis by looking few but important cases where EU external governance was subject to failure. Then, conclusion will be drawn based on the outcomes of the analysis.

The approach taken in this paper can be considered as historical institutionalist approach: historical because the Europeanization of the Balkans is understood as a process unfolding over time; institutionalist because it emphasizes the importance of institutions – whether these be rules, norms or structures. Therefore, the reasons of slow Europeanization in the Balkans must be explored in the context of changes in the nature of the European Union in the last two decades.

The collapse of the soviet regimes in Eastern Europe and the end of bipolar world engendered a number of changes in the interpretation of the nature of the European Union which were envisioned in the Treaty on European Union. The Maastricht Treaty presented a new stage in European integration by creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, these changes do not ignore civilian nature of the EU, but adds military aspects to them (Deighton, 2010, pp. 719-720). Another change occured in the nature of the relations between the EU and third countries. After a long period of ‘politics of excommunication’ during the Cold War, there was observed a shift towards ‘politics of inclusion’. This thesis was put forward by Smith who noted that the reason of this change is the need ‘to reflect the changing demands of the European order’ (1996: p. 5). The first change, mentioned above, in the interpretation of the nature of the European Union is closely related with the second change, as it is based on the logic of that more outwardly-oriented EU should have military tools in its command. Such kind of approach is also embedded in EU actorness. The most recent shift in the nature of the EU which occured after 2004 and 2007 enlargements is the move from the concept of EU foreign policy to EU external governance which enables more comprehensive understanding of EU-third country relations.

It is certain that the Europeanization process in the Balkans cannot be uninfluenced by these changes. Even, to some extent, the Balkans became one of the main driving forces of the processes discussed above. There are several factors that may be considered as obstacles to the process of Europeanization in the Balkans: Conflicts and increasing ethnic tension and nationalism in the region; underdeveloped economy; historical and geo-political factors; geo-graphical remoteness from Western Europe and thus, lack of shared experience of democratic institutions and liberal democracy. The first and second reasons fall under the realist explanation of slow Europeanization in the region, while the third and forth reasons are substantiated in the sturucturalist framework. Another explanation can be provided from NeoGramscian perspective. Explanations to EU eastward enlargement from Neo-Gramsian perspective (Bieler, 2002; Bohle, 2006) can be useful for understanding reasons of slow Europeanization in the Balkans. Bieler provides a set of relations among international, national and subnational actors in Austrian and Swedish cases

By analyzing relations in the region based on this set, one can explore reasons of slow Europeanization process in the Balkans. However, this is not the subject of this paper.

All of these explanations regard the reasons of slow Europeanization as embedded in the Balkan states, themselves. Nevertheless, one should also search the reasons in the effectiveness of EU external governance in the Balkans. Is or was EU external governance highly effective in the Balkans? Could the EU meet challenges in the Balkans? This paper will focus on the answers of these questions. The time of development of EU external governance or external influence tools overlapped with the period of emerging problems in the Balkans. Therefore, when conflicts, economic and political crisis broke out in the Balkans, the EU was not ready to deal with these problems. Thus, the EU could not perform effective external governance. In a result, the process of Europeanization was affected by ineptness of the EU.

Although many definitions have been provided for the conception of Europeanization by scholars, there is no prevailing conception of Europeanization. This term popularly used in academic writings of mid-1990s. Most probably, this popularity was influenced by the EU’s enlargement towards Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. Different conceptions of Europeanization addressed different dimensions of it. But none of them are able to wholly explain the phenomenon alone. Olsen argues that these ‘different conceptions of Europeanization complement, rather than exclude each other’ (Olsen, 2002: p. 922). As the author notes, the different conceptions of Europeanization refer to different, but related phenomena. In this disorderly field of research, the author provides five faces of Europeanization which can be understood as a categorization of different conceptions of Europeanization provided by different authors:

• Europeanization as changes in external territorial boundaries;
• Europeanization as the development of institutions of governance at the European level;
• Europeanization as central penetration of national and subnational systems of governance;
• Europeanization as exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory;
• Europeanization as a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe (ibid. p. 922-923).

It is obvious from five faces of Europeanization that there are five different phenomena referred to by the term. These are also five different answers to the question of what is changing under the name of Europeanization. Mention should also be made of Europeanization beyond the European Union. Is the Europeanization confined with a process of admission to EU membership? Restricting the Europeanization merely with the admission process to the European Union or the process which leads to the accession negotiations is not the right approach, if to remind that none of the Balkan states had the perspective of membership before 1999. Absence of membership perspective promised by EU officials does not mean that there never membership perspective will be promised. The first and second faces of Europeanization concern the process of admission to the European Union. The fourth face regards EU external governance which is different from the accession process. The third face is characteristic for both accession process to the EU and EU external governance. The last – fifth face concerns more inclusive conception of the Europeanization by referring to both EU external governance and the process of admission to EU membership.  However, all the five faces of Europeanization involve domestic changes in target countries and integration. Furthermore, relations between EU and third countries which fall under one of the faces of Europeanization are mainly based on convergence to EU rules, and thus, hierarchical.  To sum discussions on Europeanization up, the term of Europeanization is understood as close and hierarchical relations between EU and third countries which are based on convergence towards EU rules and involve fully or partially integration of third countries’ institutions into the European Union by expanding the legal system of the European Union to target countries – rule extension. In this term, Europeanization is more than integration and accession process. However, this redefinition does not provide comprehensive conceptualization of Europeanization, since it only concerns official relations between the EU and third countries.

Europeanization can also be understood as an outcome of amendments in the interpretation of the nature of the European Union. After the collapse of the soviet regimes, the changing geopolitical situation in Europe necessitated revision of the EU’s role in Europe.  The need for increased role of the European Union was reflected in the Treaty of Maastricht which presented a new – political stage of European integration by creating the European Union with its CFSP and ESDP (Europa, 2007). The European Union foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty was more outwardly-oriented that the European Community.  The reason of this change was, on the one hand, the ambition of big European states to play influential role in the formation of the new world order. On the other hand, to a great extent, these changes were driven by external events. The collapse of the soviet regimes in Eastern Europe created a lot of problems ranging from conflicts to migration. These problems raised expectations for EU actions (Hill, 1993). The gap between expectations and capability continued to be wider up to the late 1990s (Ginsberg, 1999; p. 2). And, it started changing after St. Malo declaration. The reason of this was that Bosnian conflict and US reluctance to intervene, later on, Kosovo conflict proved that the EU should have an independent security and defence policy in order to deal with such challenges.

One more issue should be mentioned that there was rhetorical responsibility of the EU to its Eastern neighbours in terms of support to democratization. At the same time, interdependence between the EU and its new Eastern neighbours augmented. Increasing interdependence is one of the reasons of changes in the nature of the EU. Lavenex mentions that rule extension towards non-member states may be driven by internal politics as way of increasing the efficiency and problem-solving capacity of the EU (Lavenex, 2004: p. 681). Thus, a shift from ‘politics of excommunication’ to ‘politics of inclusion’ can be considered the main reason of Europeanization processes which is considered to blur the boundaries between the EU and its neighbours (ibid. p. 681).

Changes in the nature of the European Union and its relations with external world required a new approach to EU external actions. This new approach became EU external governance which prospered after the 2004 enlargement. Governance approach has been widely used to study forms of policy making within the EU. However, later EU external governance approach is much more favoured in the explanation of the EU’s relations with Eastern Europe. In the process of accession, the Central and Eastern European countries went through a large-scale process of external governance (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: p. 661). A number of scholars emphasize EU external governance as a way of coping with the interdependence between the EU and third countries (Lavenex, 2004: p. 685; Dimitrova, Dragneva, 2009: p. 853). It is obvious from difference between EU foreign policy approach and EU external governance approach (Table 1) that the later enables to have a more comprehensive view of the EU’s relations with third countries, especially with those who are candidates or in the neighbourhood. Furthermore, the EU’s relations with third countries cannot be analyzed in a way that relations between two states are analyzed. The reason is that the EU’s relations with third countries are not based on equal rights between parties and does not fit into network mode of relations.  Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier note that EU external governance is not as ‘new’ as it is claimed. Rather, it is ‘old governance’ for three reasons (2004: p. 675). Firstly, it is asymmetric, since the EU uses its superior bargaining power to set and enforce its conditionality. Secondly, the acquis communautaire is non-negotiable. Thus, the legal basis of the relations is EU-rules, rather than bilaterally produced rules. Finally, it is a top-down process is dominant in the transfer of EU rules to third countries.

Table 1. Difference between EU foreign policy approach and EU external governance approach.

            One of the ways of measuring the effectiveness of EU external governance is provided by Schimmelfennig and Lavenex. The authors argue that EU external governance can be measured by looking at rule selection at the level of international negotiations and agreements, rule adoption at domestic legislation, and rule application in domestic political and administrative practice. If a country prefers EU rules as a focus of international negotiations and agreements, transfers those rules in domestic legislation, and ensures their application, then EU external governance in that country is successful (2009: p. 800). However, this approach is EU-biased. By looking at rule selection, adoption and application, it is only possible to measure the effectiveness of the transfer of particular EU policy. Despite the fact that rule-transfer and external governance are widely used as synonyms, they can be differentiated. As noted above, external governance is a way of dealing with interdependence, and interdependence cannot be controlled only by rule-transfer. Thus, the concept of governance does not only consist of rule-transfer, but also of avoiding obstacles and problem-solving. When a problem is faced in a third country, the EU must be ready to effectively response changing situation. In case of rule-transfer, it is mainly up to EU to decide which rules, how and when transfer. Although EU external governance is ‘old governance’, it is not fully controlled by the superior. The reason is that EU external governance is not based on subordination, but on interdependence between the EU and third countries. In the light of the discussions made above, it could be agreed that the effectiveness of EU external governance is not restricted with rule transfer. And, it is not only dependent on how a third country selects, adopts and enforces rules, too. Rather, to a great extent, the effectiveness of EU external governance is dependent on how EU responds changing situations in third countries, in other words, how it deals with the interdependence. Thus, a successful process of Europeanization manly depends on the EU’s capacity to deal with unexpectedly emerging problems.

            The first case of EU trouble in the Balkans was immediately after the collapse of Yugoslavia. EC/EU member states had divergent positions on the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia. Thus, the EC/EU failed to have concerted response to the changing situation. Before the broke out of the war, during the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Germany along with other EU states was committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. However, as soon as the war escalated, Germany changed its position to support of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. German position on the independence of these two countries were supported by German public opinion, Austria as well as by the movements in Italy, Spain, Ireland, Scandinavia and several East European states. Britain and to some extent France opposed the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. They were supported by the US (Ramet & Ingebritsen, 2002: pp. 111-113). However, both the European opposing parties and the US changed their decision and recognized the independence of new states. Recognition of independence could be used as a strong tool of EU external governance, but was not because of divergence positions between EC/EU member states and failure to have concerted response to changing situations. EC/EU could encourage the conduct of reforms in newly independent states by using recognition of independence as ‘carrots’. In addition, recognition removed the room to negotiate that might have truncated the war in Bosnia (Chayes & Chayes, 1996: p. 14). Attempts by the EC/EU to apply conditionality to the resolution of conflict by suspending financial aid and imposing embargos on arms export were subject to failure because almost, all of the military bases of Yugoslavia located in Serbia and the decision of imposing embargo and suspending financial aid deteriorated the situation if favour of Serbia (ibid.). In Bosnian war, initially, the US was reluctant to interfere, and Germany was hesitant because of its leading role in the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia which, to some extent, served to the deterioration of the situation. The US urged the European Union to intervene and argued that the EU should take responsibility for its ‘backyard’ (Hansen, 2001: p. 58). Despite of all efforts, the EC-UN’s mediation was unsuccessful, and three plans presented by the mediators were rejected by Bosnian Serbs. In 1994, Serb forces carried out a massacre in Serebrenica under the eyes of UN peacekeepers. As soon as the EU’s inability to intervene was obvious, the US led NATO operations started in 1995 (Wiedenbauer, 2010: p. 5). The same scenario was played in Kosovo crisis ending with US-led NATO military intervention. These crises exposed the EU’s inability to conduct military operations when merely civilian power is not adequate to ensure peace and stability. Reasons of this failure are lack of capacity and hesitance of the member states to send their soldiers to fight when there is no national interest at stake. Lucarelli puts emphasis on ‘the member-states’ reticence to risk their soldiers in a war in which they do not perceive a vital national interest to be at stake’, rather than on the lack of EU military capability. In her words, ‘Europe’s security capacity is more a matter of political and security culture than a question of units and structures’ (2000: p. 237). Oswald also stresses ‘the lack of the unity of political will to implement any common foreign and security policy as stated in the Maastricht Treaty’ and absence of ‘required military capabilities’ (2006: p. 70).

            The EU’s civilian and normative/civilizing power in the region was not so much successful in comparison with its military power as a tool of external influence which did not exist. EU civilian and normative/civilizing power in the regions was constrained by the changes and hesitance in the EC/EU strategy towards the SEE countries. The EC/EU’s strategy towards the SEE countries can be divided into two periods: from the collapse of Yugoslavia to Kosovo crisis and later on. During the first period, relations between the EU and the region countries were confined with merely weak economic and technical assistance and conflict mediation efforts of the EU. Failure of the efforts of the EU in the resolutions of the conflicts and absence of EU membership perspective decreased EU credibility as a centre of power among the region states, and EU conditionality towards SEE countries strongly influenced by decreasing EU credibility in the region. Moreover, although, the EU conducted bilateral relations with the regions countries, Copenhagen criteria presented in 1993 envisioned regional cooperation as one of the conditions of developing relations with the EU. Nevertheless, states interpreted this condition as a way of delaying EU membership. In addition, the countries were reluctant to conduct strong relations with their neighbours because of so bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and other reasons. Croatia and Slovenia did not see themselves as part of the Balkans. Macedonia had a quarrel with Greece over the name issue (Betchev, 2006: pp. 30-33). The EU’s condition of regional cooperation also suffered from its principle of ‘compartmentalization’. That is why Romania and Bulgaria were sceptical about the deepening of regional cooperation and resisted to the Greek proposal about creation of the secretariat (Betchev, 2006: p. 33). As it is obvious from the preceding sentences, EU had contradicting principles in its strategy towards SEE countries. On the one hand, it encouraged regional cooperation as a condition of further development of relations with the EU; on the other hand, it compartmentalized SEE countries into ‘different waves’. Albeit, this principle was never publicly acknowledged, it appeared as a result of two other principles: conditionality and differentiation (Papadimitriou, 2004: p. 71). Kosovo crisis made evident that Regional Approach, OBNOVA financial program and other initiatives were limited. Therefore, the EU reconsidered its strategy towards SEE countries during and after Kosovo crises (Bogicevic, 2010: p. 22). The second period of EU strategy towards SEE countries started with the presentation of membership perspective to the region countries. With the presentation of membership perspective, SEE countries became more vulnerable to EU external governance. Thus, internal politics of countries became more open to EU influence. Moreover, interest to SEE countries increased in Western public opinion. The EU started to play the most influential pressure centre for the region. In contrast to the first period of EU strategy, in the second period, the EU could effectively concert the positions member-states in the Balkans. The outcome was the Stability pact for SEE (officially introduced by the OSCE) which was welcomed by the region that saw it as a new opportunity for developing political links with Western Europe. The Pact was linked to the Marshal Plan for the post- WW II (Betchev, 2006: p. 34).  Furthermore, Regional Approach was replaced with Stabilization and Association Process which was launched in 2000, and supposed to deepen relations between Western Balkans and Western Europe. It offered association agreements to the region’s countries which envisaged opening of European market to the products coming from the Western Balkans, and incorporated CARDS (Community Assistance, Reconstructions, Development and Stabilization) (Bogicevic, 2010: p. 23).  EU effective mediation in Macedonia conflict in 2001 increased EU credibility in the region as a conflict resolution actor. In contrast to the first period of EU strategy, in the second period, the EU could conduct its first military operation – Concordia in Macedonia. Supplemented by military power, the EU’s civilian power was also influential in the resolution of the conflict. In zenith of the conflict, the EU signed association agreement with Macedonia which helped to the resolution of the conflict. Developments in EU strategy towards the region certainly influenced the Europeanization process in the Balkans by increasing the effectiveness of EU external governance.

Although, there are different explanations of slow Europeanization in the Balkans, none of them stress the effectiveness of EU external governance as a main factor. In this paper, it is argued that the reason of slow Europeanization in the Balkans is the less effectiveness of EU external governance. There might be many factors that served to the incompetence of EU external governance. However, one and the first of them was unpreparedness of the EU to meet challenges emerging in the region. The time of development of EU external governance or external influence tools overlapped with the period of emerging problems in the Balkans. Therefore, when conflicts, economic and political crisis broke out in the Balkans, the EU was not ready to deal with these problems. The EU lacked military capabilities, common political will and enough experience in external governance to response external events efficiently. The EU was inexperienced when met these challenges. Thus, the EU could not perform effective external governance. Conflicts in the Balkans were the first test for EU external governance. In a result, the process of Europeanization was affected by ineptness of the EU. Nevertheless, the EU drew lesson from its first confrontation with problems. In this sense, it can be argued that the Balkans became the main driving force of the development of ESDP and EU external governance.

3797 words excluding references and bibliography.

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Bu yazımda  Cümhuriyyətçilik idealogiyasının XX əsrin-sonu və XXI əsrin əvvələrində ölkənin siyasi həyatında roluna qısa nəzər salmışam. Sonda isə Cümhuriyyətçilik idealogiyasın “8 oxla” müəyyənləşdirməyə çalışmışam.

SSRİ-nin dağılmasına gətirən yolda sovet sosialist respublikalarında formalaşan xalq hərəkatlarının müxtəlif  ideoloji bazaları var idi. Bu xalq hərəkatlarında ideoloji baza sovet respublikalarının qurulmasından öncəki tarixə əsaslanıdı.

XIX əsrin sonu XX əsrin əvvəllərində tarixi kontekst isə Şərqi Avropa və Qafqaz xalqlarında oxşardır: XIX əsrdə Çar Rusiyası tərəfindən işğal olunublar, birinci dünya müharibəsindən sonra isə Sovet Rusiyası tərəfindən işğal olunana qədər qısa müstəqil demokratik respublika dövrü yaşayıblar.

1988-1989-cu illərdə Azərbaycanda formalaşan xalq hərəkatı digər sovet respublikaları kimi ideoloji bazasını Sovet işğalından öncəki tarixə əsaslandırırdı. Bu əsası 1918-ci ildə qurulan Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti təşkil edirdi. Beləliklə, Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti tarixinin siyasi ideologiya kimi yenidən çiçəklənməsinin dövrü başladı.

1991-ci ildə Azərbaycan Respublikasının müstəqilliyinin bərpasından sonra hüquqi baxımdan olmasa da, tarixi-mənəvi baxımdan Azərbaycan Respublikası Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin varisi elan edildi və Cümhuriyyət idealogiyası, Cümhuriyyətçilik müxtəlif illərdə müxtəlif dərəcələrdə həm ölkə müxalifəti və həm də iqtidarı tərəfindən sahiblənildi.

Müstəqilliyin ilk illərində isə Müsavat-AXCP iqtidarı dönəmində Cümhuriyyətçilik idealogiyası ən yüksək zirvəsinə çatdı. Bu məsələdə mərhum eks-prezident Əbülfəz Əliyevin şəxsi iradəsinin rolu çox olmuşdur. Siyasi mövqeyindən asılı olmayaraq hər kəs tərəfindən Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti, onun yaradıcıları bir mənalı olaraq partiya–üstü dəyərlər kimi qəbul edildi.

Sonrakı illərdə isə bu cür yanaşmaya baxmayaraq, ölkənin iki ən böyük partiyalarından heç biri siyasi mübarizəsini Cümhuriyyətçilik idealogiyasına əsaslandırmadı və ya buna nail olmadı. Belə ki, Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyasının ortaya qoyduğu “Azərbaycançılıq” idealogiyası müəyyən mənada Cümhuriyyətçilik idealogiyası ilə ziddiyət təşkil edir.

Müstəqilliyin ilk illərində dövlətin rəsmi dili Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətində olduğu kimi Türk dili idi. Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyasının iqtidara gəlməsindən sonra 1995-ci ildə konstitusiyası ilə bu dəyişdirildi və Azərbaycan dili adlandırıldı. Bu baxımdan Xalq hərəkatı ilə yenidən çiçəklənməkdə olan Cümhuriyyətçilik idealogiyasından uzaqlaşma baş verdi.

Ana müxalifət partiyası olan Müsavat Partiyası isə siyasi mübarizəsini “Cümhuriyyətçilik” idealogiyası üzərində qurmaqda uğurlu olmadı. Müsavat Partiyasının digər partiyalardan daha çox Cümhuriyyət irsinə sahiblənməyə çalışmasına baxmayaraq, Cümhuriyyətçilik idealogiyası partiyanın əsas mübarizə yoluna çevrilə bilmədi.

Hazırda isə Cümhuriyyətçilik idealogiyası cəmiyyətdə, xüsusilə, gənclər arasında sürətlə yayılmaqdadır. Qarşıda gələn illərdə, çox güman ki, Cümhuriyyətçilik idealogiyası üçüncü çiçəklənmə dövrünü yaşayacaqdır. Lakin, bu dəfə fərqli cəhət ondan ibarətdir ki, bu proses vahid bir siyasi təşkilat tərəfindən deyil, ayrı-ayrı vətəndaş cəmiyyəti qurumları, adi vətəndaşlar tərəfindən yürüdülməkdədir.

Bu yeni mərhələdə Müsavat Partiyasında heç bir ciddi dəyişiklik müşahidə edilmir. Cümhuriyyət irsinə sahiblənməsinə baxmayaraq, siyasi mübarizəsini Cümhuriyyət idealogiyası üzərində deyil, ölkənin problemləri – sosial-iqtisadi, demokratik və s. üzərində qurmaqda davam edir.

İqtidar partiyası isə Cümhuriyyətçilik idealogiyasının genişlənməsi kontekstində bu proseslərdən uzaq qalmaqla zərər çəkməkdən ehtiyat etdiyi üçün müəyyən addımlar atmaqdadır. Lakin daha cəsarətli addımların atılması partiya üçün daha xeyirli nəticələrə gətirib çıxarda bilər.

-        Cümhuriyyətçilik nədir?

-        Cümhuriyyətçilik insanlar arasında heç bir fərq qoymadan Azərbaycan xalqı üçün bütün siyasi əqidələrdən üstdə olan Cümhuriyyət irsinə sahiblənmənin adıdır.

Cümhuriyyətçilinin 8 oxu

• Xalq Hakimiyyəti;
• Milli, hüquqi, demokratik, dünyəvi, sosial dövlət;
• Parlamentar respublika idarə üsulu;
• Dövlətin Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti adlandırılması;
• Dövlət dilinin yenidən Azərbaycan Türkcəsi adlandırılması;
• Azərbaycanlı üst kimliyini saxlamaqla, Azərbaycan Türkü alt kimliyin bərpası;
• Türkiyə və digər Türk dövlətləri ilə beynəlxalq münasibətlərdə sıx əməkdaşlıq və tərəfdaşlıq;
• Dünyanın inkişaf etmiş siyasi və iqtisadi mərkəzlərinə inteqrasiya.

Bu səkkiz oxun hər biri geniş müzakirə mövzusudur. Bu isə bu yazının çərçivəsindən kənardadır.

Foto: Ənvər Qurban

Avropa Birliyi Parlament Binası, Strasburq, Fransa

Rəsmi əlaqələr Avropa Birliyinin qaydaları üzərində yoxsa qarşılıqlı formalaşdırılmış əlaqələr üzərində qurulur? Münasibətlərin qurulmasında vətəndaş cəmiyyəti iştirak edir yoxsa yanız “elit” təkbaşına qərar verir?

İlk öncə “Politics of Discourse” (milli variant: söz öyunu) adlandıra biləcəyimiz məsələyə nəzər salaq. Dəfələrlə dövlət başçısı tərəfindən Azərbaycanın Avropaya, Avro-Atlantik məkana inteqrasiya yolunu tutduğu səsləndirilmişdir[i].

Lakin bu Avropa Birliyinə inteqrasiya anlamına gəlmir. Bununla yanaşı, Xarici İşlər Naziri Elmar Məmmədyarov açıq şəkildə bəyan etmişdir ki, Azərbaycan Avropa Birliyi və NATO ilə əməkdaşlıqda maraqlıdır, lakin bu təşkilatlara qoşulmaq niyyətində deyildir.[ii]

Avropa Birliyi tərəfindən isə Azərbaycan və digər Cənubi Qafqaz ölkələri üçün Birliyi üzvlük perspektivi vəd edilməmişdir. Nəticə olaraq, hər iki tərəf sıx münasibətlərin qurulmasında maraqlıdır, lakin heç bir tərəf bu münasibətləri Avropa Birliyinə inteqrasiya çərçivəsində görmür və yalnız əməkdaşlıqla kifayətlənir.

Münasibətlərin üç əsas istiqamət xəttini müəyyən etmək olar:

-          Ermənistan-Azərbaycan Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsinin həlli;

-          Demokratiyanin inkişafı, insan hüquq və azadlıqlarının qorunması, təhsil, sosial, səhiyyə, iqtisadiyyat, məhkəmə, dövlət qulluğu, gömrük, sığorta və digər sahələrdə islahatlar üzrə;

-          Ticarət, xüsusilə də, enerji sahəsində ticarət;

Münasibətlərin bu cür prioritetləşdirilməsi Avropa Qonşuluq Siyasəti, Azərbaycan Fəaliyyət Planında da öz əksini tapmışdır. Lakin, Fəaliyyət Planında Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsinin birinci prioritet olmasına baxmayaraq 2007-2010 və 2010-2013-cü illər üçün hazırlanmış Avropa Qonşuluq və Əməkdaşlıq İnstrumentinin milli indikativ proqramlarından münaqişənin həlli əsas prioritet olmaqdan çıxarılıb.

Yalnız, “Dağlıq Qarabağ münaqişəsinin sülh yolu ilə həllindəki inkişafdan asılı olaraq, Avropa Birliyinin münaqişənin həllinin bütün aspektləri ilə bağlı” məsələlərdə yardım göstərməyə hazır olduğu ilə kifayətlənib. [iii]

Münaqişənin həlli Avropa Birliyinin maraqları arasında olmasına baxmayaraq, Avropa İttifaqı bu məqalənin mövzusundan kənara çıxan digər səbəblər üzündən sözü gedən münaqişənin həllində aktiv rol oynamır.

Bu səbəblərdən birini Rusiyanın regiondakı xüsusi rolununda görmək olar. Avropa Birliyinin bu müdaxilə üçün kifayət qədər resurslarının olmasının da araşdırlması lazımdır.

Münasibətlərin ikinci qrup obyektivlərinə gəldikdə isə, Azərbaycan tərəfinin bu sahədə az dərəcədə nailiyyətləri olmasına baxmayaraq, Avropa Komissiyasının və Avro-inteqrasiya üzrə Azərbaycan Milli Komitəsinin hesabatlarında bu sahədə öhdəliklərin çox zəif sürətlə yerinə yetirilməsi və ya tamamilə yerinə yetirilməməsi qeyd olunur. [iv]

Bu qrup obyektivlər münasibətlərin əsas xüsusiyyətini müəyyənləşdirən obyektovlərdir. Bu obyektivlərin yerinə yetirilməsindən asılı olaraq, münasibətlərin inteqrasiya və ya əməkdaşlıq olduğunu müəyyənləşdirmək olar.

Çünki, bu öbyektivlər tərəflərdən birinin daxili siyasi sistemini və digər daxili məsələlərin yenidən formalaşdırmasına hədəflənmişdir və bu “yenidənqurma” Avropa hüquqi sistemini nümunə götürərək yerinə yetirilməlidir.Beləliklə də, bu qrupdakı obyektivlərin yerinə yetirilməməsi isə tərəflər arasındakı münasibətlərin inteqrasiya mahiyyətini itir.

Ticarət və enerji sahəsində isə münasibətlər öncəki iki istiqamət üzrə olan münasibətlərdən fərqli olaraq müsbətə doğru inkişaf edir. Hər iki tərəf ticari əlaqələrin inkişaf etdirilməsində maraqlıdır.

Azərbaycan və Avropa Cəmiyyəti/Birliyi arasında siyasi və iqtisadi əlaqələr 1991-ci ildə TACIS proqramı çərçivəsində yaradılmışdır. Münasibətlərin əsas hüquqi bazasını isə 1996-ci ildə imzalanmış və 1999-cu ildə qüvvəyə minmiş Tərəfdaşlıq və Əməkdaşlıq müqaviləsi təşkil edir. Azərbaycan Fəaliyyət Planına əsasən Assosasiya müqaviləsi imzalana qədər bu müqavilə tərəflər arasında əsas hüquqi baza olaraq qalacaqdır.

Avropa Komissiyasının internet səhifəsində çıxmış məlumata görə Azərbaycanın xarici ticarətində Avropa Birliyi ölkələrinin payı 42.8% -dir. Azərbaycanın Avropa Birliyi ölkələrinə ixracının 98.8%-i isə neft və qaz təşkil edir.[v]

Bu göstərici isə ticari münasibətlərin nə dərəcədə enerji sahəsi ilə məhdudlaşdığını göstərir. Ticarət sahəsində əlaqələrin çərçivəsini 1996-cı il müqaviləsinin müəyyən etməsinə baxmayaraq, hüquqi bazasını ikitərəfli formalaşdırılmış və ya beynəlxalq qaydalar təşkil edir.

Münasibətlərin üç əsas xəttini təhlil etdikdən sonra belə nəticəyə gəlmək olar ki, Azərbaycan-Avropa Birliyi münasibətləri Azərbaycanın AB-ə inteqrasiyasından daha çox ticarət sahəsində, xüsusilə enerji sahəsində bərabər hüquqlu  iqtisadi əməkdaşlığa və ya Avropa enerji bazarına inteqrasiyaya çevrilir.

Halbuki, Avropa Birliyinə inteqrasiya Avropa qaydalarına və normalarına əsasında inkişaf etdirilən ierarxik və cəmiyyətin bütün enerjidən daha çox sahələrini əhatə edən münasibətlərdir.

Praktiki olaraq münasibətlərin bu cür xarakter alması – yəni, inteqrasiya deyil, tərəflər arasında bu münasibətlərin qurulmasında yalnız icraedici hakimiyyətin və ya misbətən genişləndirsək, “elit”in müəyyənləşdirici rolda olmasını qəbul edilən kimi göstərə bilər.

Lakin münasibətlər praktikada nə qədər enerji sahəsindəki əməkdaşlıq və ya Avropa enerji bazarına inteqrasiya ilə məhdudlaşsa da, nəzəri olaraq inteqrasiya mahiyyəti daşıyır və hüquqi bazada bu əks olunmuşdur. Bununla yanaşı, Avropa Birliyinin digər qonşu ölkələrlə olan münasibətlərində olduğu kimi Azərbaycan ilə münasibətlərində də “Conditionality” və ya “Şərtilik” prinsipinə əsaslanır.

Bu prinsip ondan ibarətdir ki, üçüncü ölkələr Avropa Birliyi ilə münasibətləri inkişaf etdirmək üçün demokratiya və insan hüquqları, bazar iqtisadiyyatı sahəsində müəyyən şərtlərə cavab verməlidir. Bu Avropa Qonşuluq Siyasətinin Azərbaycan Fəaliyyət planında da qeyd olunmuşdur. Bu şərtilik prinsipi yuxarıda qeyd olunan ikinci qrup obyektivlərin səbəbini təşkil edir.

Ölkələrin Avropa Birliyi ilə münasibətlərinin inkişafı dərəcəsi yuxarıda göstərilən ikinci qrup obyektivlərlə şərtləndirilir. Tərəflər arasındakı iqtisadi əməkdaşlıq da bu şərtilik prinsipindən uzaqda deyildir. Fəaliyyət planında Azərbaycan ilə Assosasiya müqaviləsinin imzalanmasının sözü gedən planın şərtlərinin Azərbaycan tərəfindən yerinə yetirilməsi və Dünya Ticarət Təşkilatına üzvlük ilə bağlı olduğu qeyd olunmuşdur.

Beləliklə də, nəzərə   alsaq ki, hər iki tərəf iqtisadi münasibətlərin inkişaf etdirilməsində maraqlıdır, ikinci qrup obyektivlərin yerinə yetirilməsi qarşıdan gələn müddət ərzində daha da önəm daşıyacaqdır. Azərbaycanın AB-yə üzvlük perspektivinin olmaması, “elit”in AB-Azərbaycan münasibətlərində təkbaşına müəyyənləşdirici rol oynamasına əsas verə bilməz.

Çünki, yuxarıda göstərilən ikinci qrupdakı öhdəliklərin yerinə yetirilməsi tərəflər arasındakı münasibətləri beynəlxalq münasibətlərin iki suveren subyekti arasındakı münasibətlər çərçivəsindən çıxardaraq ölkənin daxili siyasəstinin və cəmiyyətin digər bütün sahələrinin Avropa Birliyi və beynəlxalq qaydalara əsasən dəyişdirilməsini nəzərdə tutur. Bu halda “elit”in münasibətlərdə təkbaşına iştirak etməsi yalnız “demokratik defisit”dən başqa bir şey deyildir.

Qısaca, haşiyəyə çıxıb onu qeyd etmək olar ki, belə perspektivin olmaması heç bir zaman olmayacaq anlamına gəlməz. Sovet sisteminin dağılmasından əvvəl heç bir Şərqi Avropa ölkəsinin AB-yə üzvlük perspektivi yox idi. Eləcə də, 90cı illərin axırına qədər Balkan ölkələri ilə bağlı vəziyyət eyni idi.

Demokratik defisitin aradan qaldırılmasına gəldikdə isə Şərqi Avropa ölkələrinin bir neçəsi  buna Avropa Birliyi ilə münasibətlərin aparılmasını xarici işlər nazirliyinin, yəni icra hakimiyyətinin səlahiyyətinində çıxarılıb parlament üzvlərinin və vətəndaş cəmiyyəti təşkilatlarının, məhkəmə sisteminin icraedici hakimimiyyət ilə bərabər şəkildə təmsil olunduğu bir qurumun səlahiyyətinə verilməsi ilə nail olublar.

Azərbaycanda dövlət başçısının sərəncamı ilə belə bir komissiya yaradılmışdır. Lakin, fəaliyyəti, demək olar ki, tamamilə yox şəklindədir və tamamilə icraedici hakimiyyət mənsublarından və bir ombudsmandan ibarətdir. Beləliklə də, demokratik defisitin aradan qaldırılması sual altında olaraq qalır.

İstinad:

]]> http://kechal.com/2011/07/18/az%c9%99rbaycan-ab-munasib%c9%99tl%c9%99ri-%e2%80%9cdemokratik-defisit%e2%80%9din-ixraci/feed/ 0 40.398861 49.794549 40.398861 49.794549 muradnasibbeyli European Union's Parliament building http://kechal.com/2011/07/18/should-the-european-union-develop-a-security-and-defence-policy-that-is-independent-of-the-nato/ http://kechal.com/2011/07/18/should-the-european-union-develop-a-security-and-defence-policy-that-is-independent-of-the-nato/#comments Mon, 18 Jul 2011 15:51:27 +0000 Murad Nasibbeyli http://kechal.com/?p=763 Continue reading »]]> The point of departure in this paper is the question of whether the European Union should develop a security and defence policy that is independent of the NATO.  The question of a security and defence policy which is independent of the NATO appeared after the collapse of soviet regimes in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the answer is embedded in the reasons of raising this question. The question has been raised to some extent because of the changes in the interpretation of the nature of the European Union and to some extent because it was driven by external events. In order to have a comprehensive view about the emergence of the question, and thus, to find the answer, it is worth to go briefly through the changes in the interpretation of the nature of the European Union and challenges to the EU in its neighbourhood. The Treaty on European Union presented a new stage of – political – integration by creating the Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP). However, these changes do not ignore civilian nature of the EU, but adds military aspects to them (Deighton, 2010, pp. 719-720). Initially, this new stage of integration was driven by the powerful states of Western Europe that were ambitious to play the role of international actor by controlling the EC/EU in their benefits. Creation of CFSP and ESDP was also the reflection of a shift from ‘politics of exclusion’ to ‘politics of inclusion’ as a result of which Europeanization prospered in academic literature. Nevertheless, rapidly changing situation in Eastern Europe did not leave the development of these policies merely to the will of powerful European states. Breakup of Yugoslavia and following wars in the Balkans threatened the security of the EU. However, when it was evident that the EU failed to give end to the conflicts in its backyard, the USA-led NATO troops intervened, although, initially, it was reluctant to do so (Wiedenbauer, 2010: p. 5; Bogicevic, 2010: p. 21). This failure had repercussions on newly emerging EU image as an international unit. Thus, based on the discussion made above, it can be argued that the EU should have an independent security and defence policy for three reasons:

• An independent security and defence policy is essential to an influential EU voice in the international fora.
• The European Union should develop an independent security and defence policy in order to be able independently and quickly to interfere in conflict areas where the NATO does not want to send troops.

Moreover, post-conflict reconstruction and other administrative tasks proved that the NATO is not capable to provide all aspects of security such as economic, social, police, etc.  Therefore, it is possible to think that there is one more reason supporting an independent security and defence policy for the EU:

• A security and defence policy within the NATO could only cover a military aspect of security. However, security understood in broad sense is beyond just military aspect, and includes economic and social dimensions.

This paper is based on these three reasons. But, most probably, there are other reasons that rooted in depth of political and socio-economic conditions. Nevertheless, because of restrictions to the scope of this paper, other possible reasons will not be researched. Furthermore, counter-arguments will not be put forward, in order to challenge the argument of this paper. However, comprehensive academic writing should include counter-arguments and to use the theory of regressions to achieve reliable outcomes.

Discussions will start with a brief view to the conceptualization of actorness and to its requirements provided by different scholar. In this part, one of the important points will be the analysis of relations between perceptions and capabilities which should not be confused with expectations and capability gaps. In the end, the term of actorness will be re-conceptualized and its requirements will be redefined. Then, discussions will move on to how the EU meets the new requirements. With a brief summary of all the discussions this part of the paper that deals with the first reason mentioned above will end.

            Afterwards, it will be argued that there are a number of conflicts in EU neighbourhood and candidate countries. Failing to deal with these conflicts can threaten the security of the EU and challange the EU’s image as a regional power by decreasing the EU’s credibility.At this point, albeit they are widely used as synonyms, external governance will be differentiated from rule-transfer.

The third reason which supports the argument that the EU should have a security and defence policy that is independent of the NATO is not widely referred by scholars and politicians However, the focus must be put on this reasons, since more than two previous reasons, it does not leave a room for claims that building an independent security and defence policy is aimed at decreasing dependence on the United States and to emerge as an alternative power to it.

In the, the conclusions will be drawn based on the outcomes of the discussions on three reasons supporting the idea of an independent EU security and defence policy.

The existing literature on ‘actorness’ can be divided into two main streams: realist and constructivist approaches. Main differences among these approaches are also reflected in their requirements for actorness. The constructivist approach emphasizes the conditions of surrounding environment and its perceptions about the unit as main factors for actorness. In contrast to constructivist approach, realists take the actor’s activities as main determinants of actorness. However, some authors agree that pure behaviourist explanations or simple structuralist accounts cannot be alone satisfactory for conceptualization of EU actorness. Rather, a good analysis of EU actorness should include internal dynamics and international developments (Papadimitriou, Petrov, and Greiçevci, 2007; p. 223). The approach taken in this paper includes some elements of both the realist and constructivist approaches. It was Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977) who first presented the idea of international actor. But later it was developed by Bretherton and Vogler (1999) as actorness. For them, the concept of actorness can be divided into three areas. Presence is the conceptualisation of internal changes and external expectations. Opportunity is a given favorable conditions of environment. Capability is the reality about the capacity of the unit which enable it to meet effectively the external expectations. Bretherton’s and Vogler’s approach to actorness is a constructivist approach according to which actorness of a particular unit cannot be considered in isolation solely based of objective material elements. Rather, it takes place in interaction with other international units (1999). Similar constructivist approach has been deployed by Larsen who considers actorness as a complex interaction between the actors constituting the unit and perceptions of the surrounding environment about the unit (2002; p.287).

For Hettne, actorness is one of the dimensions of what he calls ‘actorship’. Regionness, presence and actorness are three different dimensions of actorship. Regionness is the lowest level of actorship. . Region is a territory populated by different groups of people where there is an emerging spirit of community among these groups that originated from the long history of shared values and interactions. According to the author, a region can understood in the following levels: a social space, an international society, a community and an institutionalized polity. The last level of regionness differs from others in terms of institutionalization. At this level, there are decision-making structures and thus, higher possibility of influencing outside world (Hettne, 2008; pp. 3). Nevertheless, this dimension of actorship does not necessitate cohesiveness of preferences, policies and behaviour. Presence is something more than the foreign policy of the European Union or accumulation of foreign policies of the Member States, and emanates from the weight and scope of a unit. For this dimension the identification formation process is characteristic (ibid. p. 4). The third dimension of actorship – actorness defines world regions pursuing coordinated, coherent and consistent policies towards outside world depending on their potentials (ibid. pp. 5-6). In the light of the discussions made above, in this paper, actorness is understood as a situation of a unit in which it is capable of making decisions and ensuring its implementations, and accepted so by outside world.

In terms of requirements, different authors put emphasis on different issues of actorness. Thomas provides a good table of requirements which includes Jupille’s and Caporaso’s approach, Bretherton’s and Vogler’s approach and his own (2010; p. 6).

Table 1: Requirements for EU Actorness

In this paper, requirements consedered by Thomas will be taken as essential but with some aditions from Bretherton and Vogler: access to policy instruments and capacity to undertake international negotiations. Perceptions of outside world and capability of the actor are also included to the list of requirements for actorness. The reason of excluding other requirements considered by other authors are not explained in this paper, by virtue of space limitation. But could be find in the related work of Thomas. Thus, it is evident from the requirements selected above that the approach taken in this paper can be considered to some extent agent based by emphasizing preferences of member-states, common policy, consistent implementation of the policy and other two requirements; to some extet stucture-based by acknowledging importance of perceptions of outside world.

Perceptions of outside world about the actor is one of the main requirements of actorness, as mentioned above. These perceptions are based on the actions taken by the unit or its capability to act. But it can also be claimed that perceptions are also based on the historical image of the actor. This claim is acceptable but role of the historical image is limited in the formations of perceptions. Taken actions and capability remains as a main requirement, since without it consolidation of preferences, deliberation of common policy do not change anything. However, none of the approaches focus enough on the capability requirements of the actor. As the focus is put on the capability requirements of the unit, the question of what are the capability requirements for actorness must be answerd. From realist perspective, since an actor is self-serving utility maximiser, there must not be any restriction in type of instruments deployed in the implementation of policies. In orther words, all instruments which are influential in reaching aims must be deployed. An actor must be able to independently deploy all those influential instruments including military ones, nessecarily,  in a world where all other actors utilise this instrument. In a result, one can range capability requirements of the unit from economic, diplomatic to military ones. From the perspective of traditional realist IR theory: the EU’s status as an international actor would be dependent on the presence of certain capabilities (excluding basic assumption of statehood which the EU does not possess): a strong economy, a strong diplomatic/political capacity, military capacity and presence (Larsen, 2002; p. 283-284). In order to have an effective actorness, the EU must score high on all of these requirements.

The European Union is the world’s largest trading power and a major provider of humanitarian assistance and development aid. Throughout the cold war it has developed its ‘civilian’ power – an ability to extend its own model of ensuring stability and security through economic and political means (Sjursen, 2006; pp. 169-170). The European Union can be considered as successful in rule transfer to the candidate countries and near abroad. Its memberhsip perspective to CEECs was the most influetial instrument. It is capable to influence to countries in its neigrbourhood through conditionality. In sharp contrast to its previous failed efforts of conflict resolution in Bosnian war and Kosovo crisis, with its civilian power, the European Union achieved successes in crisis management in Macedonia in 2001 through its economic and political means. But the question is that: Is the European Union influential in other regions of the world as it is in its ‘near abroad’ with only its economic and political means? To what extent the EU could be successful in dealing with Taliban regime in Afghanistan by promising better trade conditions? If the actions of the EU are influential solely in its ‘near abroad’ and its capability is restricted to economic and diplomatic/political means, the perceptions of surrounding environment about the EU as an international actor will be under question. Trevor Salmon argues that:

“Despite wanting to restore European influence, the EC failed to recognize that the world situation required military power, and that diplomatic activity or economic activity without the potential to resort to military power could only be partially successful” (2005; p. 375).

US representative to the European Union, Rockwell Schnabel states in his “US views on the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy” that “if the European Union wants to be taken seriously not just by the US, but more importantly, by other powers who do not necessarily repect democracy, market economics, human rights, or the rule of law, it must develop military capabilities” (2003; p. 101). According to that paper, the EU should develop its military capacity within the NATO. But is the EU’s security and defence polciy within the NATO something that could fill the gap?

What are the perceptions of the world about the NATO? What would be perceptions of the world, if the EU’s military actions are based on NATO assets? Firstly, the NATO is widely percieved as a US led organization which is under the control of the US. The EU’s security and defence policy within the framework of the NATO would not cause these perceptions to change as ESDI within the NATO which emerged with Berlin plus agreement did not change anything in this sense. Secondly, the division over the Iraq war among the Member states and failure to concert their response proved that ESDI as well as any security and defence policy within the NATO framework is subject to failure as there is always probability of division between at least France and the US. Without a determinant and independent security and defence policy, the EU will fail to have concerted reponse towards challenges of outside world. Thus, it will score low on one of the capability requirements – military capability. In this situation, meeting other requirements will be meaningless. The only way of having a consolidated and concerted EU reponse to outside world is through an independent security and defence policy.

In short, the capability of the EU and the perceptions of the surrounding environment about the EU as an international actor which originated from its actions and/or from capability to act are the main factors of actorness. Economic, diplomatic/political and other means must be supplemented with military means, if the EU wants to be accepted as an independent international actor. Since, the world’s perceptions about the NATO is an American-led organization, without a security and defence policy which is independent of the NATO, the EU will trouble to be accepted as an international actor.

The second rationale of having a security and defence policy which is independent of the NATO is that there are a number of conflicts in EU neighbourhood and candidate countries, and the EU should be capable of intervening in those conflicts which is in its backyard. Letting others do that or failing to deal with these conflicts can threaten the security of the EU and challange the EU’s image as a regional power by decreasing the EU’s credibility. In case of such failure, the EU will score low on the effectiveness of external governance. Despite the fact that rule-transfer and external governance are widely used as synonyms, they can be differentiated. EU external governance is a way of dealing with interdependence countries (Lavenex, 2004: p. 685; Dimitrova, Dragneva, 2009: p. 853). However, rule-transfer is not enough for dealing with interdependence. Thus, the concept of governance does not only consist of rule-transfer, but also of avoiding obstacles and problem-solving. When a problem is faced in a third country, the EU must be ready to effectively response changing situation. Experience in Bosnian war and Kosovo crisis proved that the effectiveness of EU external governance depends not only on sucessful rule transfer, but also meeting unexpectedly emerging challenges.

Probably, inspired by the changes in the interpretation of the nature of the European Union, Chritstopher Hill presents six new functions that must be performed by the EC/EU besides four functions that it has performed up to the present in the international system. Three of those six funtions are more closely related with the question of this paper. They are followings: regional pacifier, global intervenor and mediator of conflicts. As stated by the author, since the breakdown of soviet regimes in central and eastern Europe created the possibility of conflicts break out between and within the new freed states of the region, and since, the US were seeking to reduce its commitments in Europe, the EC/EU have had to be able to act as mediator or coercive arbiter when a conflict erupts. That was what expected from the EU in the case of Yugoslavia (Hill, 1993, p. 312-313). ECG is not unbridgeable, since European Foreign Policy is an evolving and hybrid historical process. The gap between expectations and capability continued to be wider up to the late 1990s (Ginsberg, 1999; p. 2). The effectiveness of EU external governance to a greater extent depends of how the EU meets these expectations. Furthermore, after 2004 and 2007 enlargements the EU became much closer to conflict areas. Moreover, still there are some post-soviet conflicts in its ‘near abroad’. In case of Turkey’s admission the EU neighbourhood will be the Middle East and Caucasus which are ‘barrels of gunpowder’ ready to exploid unexpectedly. Having so many conflicts in the neighbourhood without an independent security and defense policy would challenge not only EU’s role as an international actor, but also its own security. The European Union do not have to wait for others to act, as it did in Bosnian conflict.

The third reason supporting an independent EU security and defence policy is related with the concept of security. How the term of ‘security’ is understood? What are the dimensions of ‘security’ provided by the NATO? Is the NATO capable of supplying the ‘security’ that the European Union needs? These are the main questions that must be answered in order to skecht a large picture of the main question of this paper. Trevor Salmon converges all of these questions in one question: Defence of what? The author, divides discussions about the concept of security into two parts: security for ‘narrowers’ and security for ‘wideners’ (Salmon, 2005, pp. 360-361).  For ‘narrowers’, security is understood in terms of military defence and use of force. From ‘narrowers’ perspective, the main purpose of security is to procure, deploy, engage or withdraw military forces.  Walt defines the concept of security, as ‘the study of the threat, use and control of military force’, especially of ‘the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war’ (Walt, 1991 in TTSRL, 2007; p. 18). According to Bellany, security is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur (ibid.). Such conceptualization of security was appropriate for Cold War conditions. For Garnet, emphasis on the military aspect of security ‘complemented ideas of power and interest and the rather tough-minded approach to foreign policy which seemed appropriate for the Cold War years’ (Garnett, 1996a in TTSRL, 2007; p. 18). However, this tendency started to change from the late years of Cold war. As a result, the concept of security turned to be understood in a broad sense. For ‘wideners’ the term of ‘security’ is understood in a broad sense. Besides the military aspect of security of a unit, they also emphasize the economic and environmental aspects of security. For them, the security is not just about the state’s physical survival. The values and lifestyle of the society and everything else that characterizes its way of life are part of its security (Salmon, 2005, pp. 361).

As the world is shrinking everyday, it is becoming more contagious, speedy, riski and fragile (Monck and Hanley, 2007. pp. 15-35). These four main characteristics of the globalized world is changing the concept of security very rapidly and it is becoming more and more inclusive as to cover different areas such as health, education and culture, besides those mentioned above. As a result of this widenening, the concept of secutiy is becoming much closer to the concept of vulnerability and protection of status-quo. To redefine the term of security, it is about any radical changes in all walks of life that may occur as a result of both external and internal incentives.  However,  Mesjasz states that:

‘In descriptive terms security and its counterparts in various languages reflect the relations between object (subject) and its environment. For any analytical considerations it must be also born in mind that security is a normative, emotionally laden idea. Any attempts to elaborate a comprehensive definition of security are of course vain’ (2004; p. 4).

Since, the NATO is a military and half-poltical organization, the concept of security provided by the NATO is confined to only military aspect of security. The NATO is not capable of supplying the security of the EU in a broad sense. Nor it would be possible for the security and defence policy of the EU within the framework of the NATO to cover other aspects of security. Nevertheless, the EU have a wide range of presence in the world and it has to meet the requirements of the globalized world in order to survive and be able to sell itself to others as an international actor.

To summarize all that has been discussed in this paper, the answer to the question is that the European Union should develop an independent security and defence policy for three reasons. Firstly, after analysis of actorness and it requirements, it has been clear that capability-perception relations are very important for being accepted as an international actor. Therefore, the EU should develop an independent security and defence policy based on its own capability if it is ambitious to perform the role of an international actor. Secondly, as there are a number of conflicts in candidate countries and its ‘near abroad’, and there are expectations from the EU to intervene in those conflict areas or to act as a mediator when it is need. The EU should meet these expectations in order to confirm itself as a regional leader and an international power. The EU must be capable of intervening to those conflicts but also for its own security. It must not wait for the US to interfere when there is an emergence, especially when the US capability is being exhausted in Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Thirdly, the concept of security provided by the NATO is confined to only military aspect of security. However, in a globalized world, the concept of security is becoming so inclusive as to cover different walks of life besides military one.  The NATO is not capable of supplying the security of the EU in a broad sense. Nor it would be possible for the security and defence policy of the EU within the framework of the NATO to cover other aspects of security. However, the EU have a wide range of presence in the world, and it has to meet the requirements of the globalized world in order to survive as an international actor.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    3830 words excluding references

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While theorizing external governance, firstly, it will be touched to differences between EU external relations approach and EU external governance approach. Then, discussions will move on to modes of external governance and approaches to it. After finishing the theoretical framework, EU-Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan-Russia and the CIS relations will be analyzed separately. Because of space limitations, it is found to be necessary to restrict the scope of analysis of the relations with foreign policy, economy and trade aspects.

As stated above, EU external governance approach developed after 2004 and 2007 enlargements, and factors that sustained this development are challenges emerged as a result of historical enlargement and increased interdependence between the EU and its neighbourhood. Moreover, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig argue that there is one more reason of expansion of external governance. It is, in their words, ‘external effects of integration’ (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009: pp. 793-794). According to the authors, external governance can also emerge spontaneously when the EU and a third country are highly mutually interdependent, and adoption of EU rules is in the interests of the third country (ibid. p. 792). The third reason entails in itself normative/civilizing power of the European Union which is discussed by Sjursen (2006). In another work of Lavenex, she mentions that rule transfer may be driven by internal policies as a way of solving internal problems or increasing the efficiency of the Union (Lavenex, 2004: p. 681). This is an institutionalist approach, and can be considered as one of the reasons of the expansion of external governance, too.

There are three explanations of the effectiveness of external governance: (i) an institutionalist approach which emphasizes the degree of legalization and legitimacy of the EU rules; (ii) a power-based, for which the effectiveness of EU external governance depends on the bargaining power of the EU; and (iii) domestics factors approach – For this approach, there is a necessity of taking into account domestic factors influencing effectiveness of EU external governance such as capacity of the target state, the cost of adoption, veto players and the effect of adoption of EU rules (Barbế et al., 2009: pp.835-838; Schimmelfennig & Lavenex, 2009: pp. 801-805). Explanations of the effectiveness of external governance from the perspective of these three approaches can vary across the sectors of the relations between the EU and third countries. Different approach may be applied in different sectors of relations such as foreign policy, trade, energy, transport, environment, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), etc. It is possible to notice that these approaches are reflected in the explanations of the models of EU external governance. However, none of these approaches consider factors outside the bilateral relations between the EU and the target country which may influence EU external governance. There is a need for a new explanation of the effectiveness of external governance which is not built merely on the interests and capacities of the EU and a third country, but also takes into account the possible influence by foreign powers. Such kind of explanation should not seek the success of EU external governance only in bilateral relations between the EU and a third country. Search for such explanation is not the aim of this paper. The research in this paper is conducted in the absence of such theoretical explanation.

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier render three models of EU external governance: the external incentives model; the social learning model; the lesson-drawing model (2004: pp. 661-679). If to bring together the reasons of expansion of external governance provided above with these models, it can be seen that the first, second and fourth reasons fit into the first model of external governance, while the third reason is appropriate for the second model.

Mention should also be made of modes of governance which are also applicable to external governance. There are three basic institutional forms: hierarchy, networks and markets. This mode of governance is characterized by strongly legalized and institutionalized asymmetric relations between the sides, in our case, the EU and a third country. It is a relationship of domination and subordination which based on binding prescriptions. In this mode, influence is exerted through legislation in modern states, and institutionalization is very tight. Contrary to the previous mode, in the network mode of governance the parties are officially equal. But this does not mean that there is absolutely no possibility of asymmetric relationship. It means that in terms of institutionalization and legalization no actors can bind the other party. In the third basic mode of external governance, there is a competition between formally independent and equal actors, and agreed objectives are the result of the competition. Institutionalization is very loose, and contrary to the first mode of governance, actor constellation is horizontal as it is in the network mode of governance (Whichmann, et al, 2009: pp. 814-817; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009: pp. 796-800). These are the basic or ideal modes of governance. In practice, one could face these modes of governance in different levels varying across sector. Moreover, to bear in mind, these are formal modes of governance which are sensitive and vulnerable to informal patterns of governance. The shadow of informal hierarchical patterns of relations can affect formal modes of governance. The mode of external governance in a particular case can be explored by analyzing the degree of institutionalization and legalization of the relations between the EU and a third country. In addition, it is possible to determine the mode of external governance by discovering ways of rule transfer in accordance with the three ways of EU rule transfer – convergence towards EU rules, convergence towards international rules, convergence based on bilaterally developed rules – provided by Barbế et al. (2009: pp. 835-838). Convergence towards EU rules or in other words, imposition of EU rules is a characteristic of hierarchical mode. In network mode, the convergence is towards international and bilaterally produced rules. In the third mode of external governance preference is given to bilaterally produced rules.

Since EU external governance is external incentive model of external governance which is rationalist bargaining model, power based approach will be taken in this paper. Actors are assumed to be utility-maximizers aimed at augmentation of their power. Furthermore, external governance is not as “new” as claimed. Rather, it exhibits characteristics of ‘old governance’-hierarchical mode of external governance: asymmetric, non-negotiable, a top-down process (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: pp. 675). While defining groups of objectives in bilateral relations between parties, the discursive approach is employed.

Lavenex draws the outer contours of EU external governance by grouping countries in five types of association: quasi-membership, accession association, neighbourhood association, development co-operation and transatlantic co-operation (Lavenex, 2004: p. 683). EU-Azerbaijan relations fall under the third category. The EU has started to cooperate with Azerbaijan after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since the start of negotiations, emphasis is put on three groups of issues: (i) democracy, human rights, good governance, economic and social reforms; (ii) trade and energy; and (iii) Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Such prioritization is reflected in all general documents concerning the relations between the parties including National Indicative Programmes of European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. ENP Azerbaijan Action Plan provides priorities in the following order: Peaceful Solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; strengthening democracy in the country; strengthening the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. Priorities 4, 5, 6 and 7 are about business and investment climate, fighting corruption, economic reforms. Eighth priority emphasizes the strengthening of EU-Azerbaijan energy bilateral relations. The last two priorities are related with JHA and regional cooperation (EU-Azerbaijan, ENP Action Plan, 2006: pp. 3-8). Indeed, this kind of prioritization tells a lot about the interests of parties in cooperation, and thus about the nature of the relations. As it is obvious from these priorities, the European Union and Azerbaijan are interested in trade relations including energy export from Azerbaijan to Europe, maintenance of stability and peace in the region, and expansion of EU legal system to the partner country through adoption of EU rules and standards and sometimes international rules by conducting reforms in the social, judiciary, economic, health, education, insurance, civil services sectors of the country as mentioned in ENP AP (ibid.). These objectives are overlapping with the objectives mention in the European Security Strategy 2003. So, one could decide that in this sense EU external governance achieved some success in the first step of it. Albeit, these priorities are agreed bilaterally, the EU could impose its preferences. This will be much more obvious in the following sentences. Whilst analyzing the attitudes of the parties towards these objectives, it becomes evident that one of the parties is reluctant to the achievements of this or other objectives or does not want to involve in its implementation.

The first objective as mentioned in the EU-Azerbaijan ENP AP is the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and thus, restoration of peace and stability in the region. Albeit, this objective is in the interest of the EU, it refrains from involving in conflict resolutions. Notwithstanding the fact that the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the first priority of ENP AP and Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013 outlines it as a part of Azerbaijan’s internal policy agenda, European Neighbourhood and Partnership National Indicative Programmes for 2007-2010 and 2010-2013 do not contain this objective in the list of priorities. ENPI NIP’s suffice to mention that

Depending on developments regarding the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the EU will be ready to provide specific assistance related to all aspects of conflict settlement and settlement consolidation and strengthening of relevant civil society actors.

One of the reasons of this containment could be the EU’s hesitance to intervene in the area of Russian influence. If the EU decides to participate as a co-chair of Minsk Group of the OSCE instead of France, its partner in the group will be Russia with whom it should work over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In its turn, Azerbaijan is lagging in meeting the requirements of the second group of objectives. The government is reluctant or not capable of starting substantial reforms in the sectors mentioned above. As ENPI NIPs for 2007-2010 and 2010-2013, ENPI CSP for 2007-2013 mention, Azerbaijan’s commitments to the implementation of ENP AP remains slow and uneven, albeit, there are few developments. The 2007 report of Azerbaijan National Committee on European Integration also confirms this fact (ANCEI, Annual Report, 2007). However, the European Union continues closely following the situation of human rights and rule of law in Azerbaijan. It frequently issues statements with regard to internal political events of Azerbaijan, not least after 11 March and 2 April (Great People Day  and Day of Rage, as named by the activists) attempts of youth activists to organize peaceful demonstrations in the central squares of the capital, Baku, and after the arrest of two youth activists – Jabbar Savalan and Bakhtiyar Hajiyev.

The situation in the third group of objectives is different from the two previous ones. Both parties are strongly interested in enhancing trade relations especially, trade in the field of energy. Economic and political links between Azerbaijan and the European Union started in 1991 after the fall of Soviet Union within the framework of TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Community of Independent States). This cooperation was mainly based on energy and transportation. However, bilateral cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan was essentially implemented after the signing of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which entered into the force in 1999. And, according to the EU-Azerbaijan ENP AP, until the signing of new Association treaty the PCA is the main legal basis of EU-Azerbaijan relations. According to the information published on the webpage of the European Commission, the EU is the main trade partner of Azerbaijan with 42.8% of overall trade of the country (European Commission, Trade, 2010). The percentage of oil and gas in Azerbaijan’s export to the EU is 98.8% (ibid.). This fact shows the importance of energy trade in EU-Azerbaijan relations.

As a rich country with oil and natural gas resources, Azerbaijan is an alternative supplier of energy to Europe, which could decrease the EU’s dependence on Russian energy. Azerbaijan oil and natural gas resources are being carried to Europe through Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines. Furthermore, other projects are being considered such as Nabucco and TransAdriatic Pipeline. Azerbaijan is also exporting oil and gas to Ukraine and Belarus (News.Az, 2011; UkraineBusiness, 2011). There is another project which is called AGRI. Azerbaijan, Georgian, Romania Interconnector. Sides of this project agreed to complete technical and economical basis of the project by 1 April (Aze.Az, 2011). All these projects are parts of Southern gas corridor which will carry Azeri and Central Asian gas to Europe. Energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 emphasized the importance of EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation in energy sector. The special strategic importance of Azerbaijan to the EU as a gas and oil supplier is recognized in the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between the European Union and Azerbaijan in the field of Energy. The memorandum explicitly mentions the perspective of ‘gradual convergence with the EU’s internal energy market aimed at integration’ as a shared priority of both parties. On 13 January, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and the president of European Commission Jose Manuel Barosso signed ‘Joint Declaration on Southern Gas Corridor’ during the visit of the latter to Azerbaijan (President.Az, 2011). Besides being important as an energy supplier, Azerbaijan is also a transit country for Central Asian energy resources.

To sum up, based on the analysis of EU-Azerbaijan relations following results have been achieved. EU-Azerbaijan relations are conducting essentially in three directions which are reflected in EU document as priorities. In terms cooperation in resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, there is no active involvement by the EU, and there never has been an official call for EU involvement by Azerbaijan side. One of the reasons of this is the EU’s hesitancy to enter Russian influence and Azerbaijan’s concerns for Russian response in case of EU involvement. In terms of cooperation in promotion of democracy, human rights and freedoms, and good governance, Azeri government is not fully implementing its commitments to PCA and ENP AP, despite the EU’s attempts to keep its partner fully attached to its commitments. The reason of this may be that the EU does not possess strong influence mechanisms to Azeri government or democracy and the human rights and freedoms are being victims of oil and gas. It is obvious from the discussions above that EU-Azerbaijan relations in the field of energy, in contrast to two previous issues, is developing very rapidly. Both sides are interested in close cooperation in energy sector. However, this is not happening in the context of integration. It is much more hybrid mode of relations (half-network and half-market modes), as there is loose institutionalization and medium-level competition between equal partners. The bargaining power of Azerbaijan in energy relations is much stronger than it is in other two groups of objectives. Convergence in energy relations is towards bilaterally produced rules, rather than EU rules. EU failure to exert influence on Azerbaijan in the achievement of the second group of objectives convert EU-Azerbaijan relations from integration to cooperation, since the second group of objectives are the main elements of integration or in other words, external governance. There is also, what can be called, ‘politics of discourse by Azerbaijan government. Azerbaijan’s president stated several times that Azerbaijan is aiming at integration into Europe or Euro-Atlantic Centre (Trend, 2007; Yeni Azerbaycan, 2009). However, the foreign minister of the country states that: ‘Azerbaijan aspires to cooperation with European Union and NATO, but it is not going to join these organizations’ (Association for Civil Society Development in Azerbaijan, 2010). The press release of EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Council’s seventh meeting show the degree of salience of each of three groups of objectives for both sides. In a short press release, the first issue mentioned is the cooperation in the energy field, the second human rights, the third conflicts in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, there is loose institutionalization and legalization is very limited.

Russia-Azerbaijan and CIS-Azerbaijan relations are not as complex as EU-Azerbaijan relations. There are some factors – past-dependencies or soviet legacies – that make Russia-Azerbaijan and CIS-Azerbaijan relations different from EU-Azerbaijan relations. Russia-Azerbaijan relations cannot be influenced from the history of two countries. Azerbaijan was one of the Soviet Republics constituting the USSR. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the restoration of independence of Azerbaijan in 1991, Russia remained as a centre of integration for post soviet countries. Pursuing fully west-oriented policy has never been successful in any post soviet republic with the exception of Baltic States. One of the reasons of this is that economic interdependence between Russia and other Soviet countries necessitated economic relations with Russia. Furthermore and more importantly, the collapse of Soviets left ethnic-territorial conflicts in all post-soviet republics including Azerbaijan. This strong interdependence between Russia and its new neighbours enabled the former to exert influence over those new republics. The factors that are creating interdependence between Russia and Azerbaijan also determine main directions of relations between two countries. Thus, main directions are the followings: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, trade, energy.  Russia is one of the co-chairs of Minsk Group of the OSCE which is brokering with Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is widely held opinion among the politicians and people of the regions that ‘the key of the conflict is in the hands of Russia’. Rebuilding peace and stability in the Caucasus is characterized as one of the interests of Russian Federation. According to its National Security Concept ’outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (NSC of the RF, 2000). Thus, Russia provides internal legal basis of its interference in the Caucasus. Furthermore, there is a Russian military base in Armenian city Gyumri since its independence and according to Russian-Armenian Agreement signed in 2010 the base may stay in Armenia till 2044 and will support Armenian security and development of its army (Tvikel, 2010; Karavaev, 2010). Moreover, both the Russia and Armenia are parts of the Organization of Collective Security Treaty. Despite these facts, Russia continues its role as a mediator in Minks Group. There is widely held opinion among Azeri scholars and politicians that if Azerbaijan ignores Russian mediation, it will lose it completely. This is one the mechanisms of influence that cast shadow over equal and bilateral relations between Russia and Azerbaijan.

In terms of trade relations, Russia is one of the main trade partners of Azerbaijan, besides Turkey. Trade turnover between Azerbaijan and Russia is determined by free trade deal between the governments of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Russian Federation on 30 September in 1992. According to the information published on the webpage of State Committee on Statistics, Russia is the third main trade partner of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is a newly emerging energy supplier who enters Russian market. In early years of independence, the only way of exporting Azerbaijan’s energy resources to Europe was pipelines passing through Russian territory. This made Azerbaijan dependent on Russia. After the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline Azerbaijan became fully free from being dependent on Russia in the export of energy resources. However, the pressure of Russia on Azerbaijan aimed at buying or transiting all its energy resources increased. On 14 October 2009, Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company president and Gazprom CEO signed an agreement on Azerbaijani gas exports to Russia, and thus Azerbaijan turned from being importer of Russian gas to an exporter of gas to Russia (Socor, 2009). The amount of Azerbaijan’s gas exported to Russia was increased in 2011 by 2 bln. cubic meters (Krishtalyev, 2010a). Trade in the field of energy is not confined with the only trade of gas. Azerbaijan is exporting oil through Novorossiysk oil pipeline. Parties are also trading in the field of electro energy (ibid.). Azerbaijan’s gas and oil export to Russia is mainly aimed at decreasing Russian influence over the conflict and to keep it neutral and less-damaging. In contrast to its relations with Russia, CIS-Azerbaijan relations is very restricted. Even there was time, when Russia mass media wrote about Azerbaijan’s readiness to secede its membership of the CIS (Vlasov, 2008). However, in 2010 the PM of Azerbaijan announced that they are supporting continuation of the existence of the CIS (ActualComment, 2010). Relations within the CIS are based on equal rights and convergence towards both bilaterally and collectively produced rules. Azerbaijan is not participating in Organization of Treaty on Collective Security which is the military body of the CIS. Moreover, Azerbaijan is not part of Customs Union which consists of Russia Belarus and Kazakhstan. The only reason of continuation of its membership in the CIS is that it serves to good relations with Russia. There is no any constraint to EU-Azerbaijan relations by the CIS.

Both Azerbaijan-Russia and Azerbaijan-CIS relations are network mode of relations which based on equal rights and bilaterally produced rules. However, on account of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and strong Russian influence over the resolution of the conflict, Russia sway influence over Azerbaijan. Due to this fact, the EU as well as Azerbaijan is to take in account the Russian influence in all projects and relations of the EU with Azerbaijan.

Despite of being bilaterally agreed, the objectives of EU-Azerbaijan relations are not achieved fully. Firstly, Azerbaijan is not keen to conduct comprehensive reforms in different sectors of society, and the EU does not possess enough influential mechanisms to influence Azeri government.  Moreover, not all of the EU’s rewards (‘a stake in the EU’s internal market’, engagement in conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation, participation in Community programmes) mentioned in ENP AP under the name of ‘new partnership perspectives’ are not attractive for Azerbaijan. Secondly, the EU is reluctant to intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, partially because of strong Russian influence over the conflict and in whole region. However, Russia plays the role of arbiter-like mediator in the resolution of the conflict which the EU could not do. Thirdly, in the field of energy, Russia and the EU are competing over Azerbaijan energy resources. At the same time, Azerbaijan is in the situation of competition with Russia for European energy market. Albeit, Azerbaijan’s preference is in favour of European consumers, Russia’s influence is strong enough to create problems for Southern Corridor of the EU by allowing escalation of conflict in the region or pressuring Azerbaijan for much more gas purchase or deploying its economic tools as the third main trading partner of its South neighbour. EU-Azerbaijan relations is formally hierarchical and aimed at economic integration and political cooperation through convergence on EU rules. However, it is, almost, confined with cooperation in the field of energy and transit based on equal rights and network mode of relations, rather than integration. In contrast to EU-Azerbaijan relations, Russia-Azerbaijan relations is formally network mode of relations with convergence on bilaterally produced rules. However, Russian possession of strong mechanisms of influence casts shadow over formal relations. Thus, EU external governance in Azerbaijan is constrained by Russian informal influence and partially Azerbaijan’s reluctance because of its internal politics. In order to meet these constraints, firstly, the EU should more actively be involved in the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and thus, lessen Russian influence over Azerbaijan. Secondly, it should make its ‘rewards’ more alluring for Azerbaijan. Thirdly, it should avoid from converting economic integration of its partner into cooperation.  Moreover, restoration of peace and stability in the South Caucasus region is salient for the EU at least for its actorness where it will be shaped by standing against Russian special preferences in the region.

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European Commission, 14 November 2006. Communication from the Commission. ‘EU-Azerbaijan European Neighbourhood Policy, Action Plan’.

European Commission, 2007. Communication from the Commission. ‘European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Azerbaijan, Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013’.

European Commission, External Relations Directorate General, 2007. Communication from the Commission. ‘European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Azerbaijan, National Indicative Programme, 2007-2010’.

European Commission, External Relations Directorate General, 2011. Communication from the Commission. ‘European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Azerbaijan, National Indicative Programme, 2011-2013’.

European Union, OSCE Permanent Council. 7 April 2011. ‘EU Statement on the situation of fundamental freedoms in Azerbaijan’. Vienna, Nr 857

Lavenex, S. and Lehmkuhl, D. and Whichmann, N. 2009. “Modes of external governance: a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison”. Journal of European Public Policy, 16:6, pp. 813-833

Lavenex, S., and Schimmelfennig, F., 2009. “EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European Politics”. Journal of European Public Policy 16:6, 791-812

Marks, E., November 1996. ‘The CIS and the Caucasus’. Institute for National Strategic Studies. (90)

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Simao, L., 2011. ‘The Eastern Partnership and EU-Azerbaijan Relations’. Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy Biweekly Newsletter, 4:5, pp.1-5

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• Structural changes, which will bring about more coherence and coordination in external actions, are also accompanied with authoritative changes. Such authoritative changes are obtained by the EU institutions outside the Council, can be considered as a transformation of power or go away from transgovernmentalism. But these changes are not sharp turns, rather, are slight moves towards institutionalism, a slow and gradual process again;
• Changes in policy and procedures which serve much stronger EU presence.

By virtue of space limitation, it is not possible to cover all changes which fall under these categories.

Before starting discussions on these three points, the notion of external presence should be explicated. This will be followed by altercation of how the pre-Lisbon environment of the world order strengthened enthusiasm of the leaders for further development of integration, and influenced the directions of discussions. Therefore, changes adopted in the Treaty originated as ways of solutions of the real problems. Thus, it is highly practicable.

Albeit, both of the words in both phrases – external presence and foreign affairs – nearly carry the same meaning, the former has broader meaning than the later. The notion of external presence should not be understood as only foreign affairs of a state or union with third countries and organization. Besides classic notion of foreign affairs which includes political and military aspects of relations outside the borders, the notion of external presence also covers other areas such as trade, development issues, humanitarian aid, cultural and other commercial relations, etc. Since the European Union differs in its nature from a classic state model and the EU is not a kind of a union like USSR, we must not attribute the notion of foreign affairs of classic states to the European Union. Maria J. Rodrigues note similar ideas in his ‘Europe, Globalisation and Lisbon Agenda’: ‘Given the unique nature of ‘European construction’, it is necessary to develop an external strategy that differs from the traditional approach pursued by nation-states’ (2009: p. 210).

However, the new notion of external presence as it is described above is also applicable for classic states. This is to say that, the notion of foreign affairs or with its new name, external presence enlarged to compass, almost, all actions taken with respect to subjects that are on the other side of the borders. For Missiroli, the traditional notion of ‘foreign policy’ has been made timeworn by the realities of the new era (Missiroli, 2010: p. 430).

According to Jean-Claude Piris, the core ideas of the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon were, for the first time, introduced in the Laeken Declaration in December 2001 which reflected concerns of national political leaders and European institutions about the future of the European Union. Three basic tasks put forward in the declaration: ‘to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European institutions, to organize politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union, and to develop the Union into a stabilising  factor and a model in the new, multi-polar world’ (Piris, 2010, pp. 12-14). In order to fulfil these tasks a number of specific questions were put forward in which included the issue of defining ‘the EU’s role in an increasingly global environment, simplification of the EU’s political instruments, and integration of the treaties into a constitution for the EU, etc.’ (Miller, 2002: p.9). This declaration is an indicator of that, at that time, national political leaders and European institutions had been aware of that it was appropriate time to start furthers steps of integration. The start of the so called new world order with the terror attacks of 9/11 and events following it created the necessary political environment for encouragement of political leaders and institutions to start changes. Since the US was in the war, the US’ intervention was less possible.

Changes which would have to be made in the beginning were to a lesser degree about the common foreign and security policy than it was in the end. The reason of this was the political environment of the world which influenced the way discussion held. For Rodrigues, such a change of focus, paying greater attention to the external presence, may be a result of radical changes in political and economical order of the world (2009: p. 210).

The Convention which took its mandate from the Laeken Declaration had to provide ‘a starting point for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference (hereafter, IGC) which will later take place and make final decisions on the future of Europe. The Convention started in February 2002 and ended its work in July 2003 by proposing ‘a draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ to IGC which held its first meeting on 4 October 2003 in Rome. After a number of amendments and discussions the Treaty was signed in Rome on 29 October 2004 (Piris, 2010: pp. 15-17). Important events continued to occur throughout the process that led to the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, such as terror acts in London and Madrid and the invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition outside the mandate. Two terror attacks – one was on the London subway system in July and the other was on commuter trains in Madrid – influenced both public opinion and European institutions. One of the significant measures taken by the European states is a European Union-wide arrest warrant, first proposed immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks as Golino notes in his special article to the Washington times. Then, he continues:

‘Specialists on both sides of the Atlantic agree that in the four-plus years since the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, European Union nations have made significant progress in developing a more coherent multinational approach to countering this threat… Meanwhile, the European Union has tried to coordinate the counterterror policies of its 25 members, particularly by harmonizing their laws and policies’ (Goliath, 2005)

Disagreement between European states and failure to concert European reaction to Iraq war and absence of joint security strategy heightened eagerness of European leaders towards the establishment of a single voice of Europe in the world. There were some attempts to give an end to such a situation. In April 2003 Belgian government initiated to hold a summit the topic of which was the creation of an independent European defence headquarters. Only France, Germany and Luxembourg and not any other European states attended to the summit. This caused the deepening of the division between European states which was described as a division between ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’ by the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld. One more attempt was made by Solana’s Secretariat by drafting European Security Strategy in 2003. After the failure of achieving ‘Helsinki Goals’ by 2003, the last attempt was a joint initiative of French and British governments to create battlegroups. This was adopted within the framework of the military Headline Goal 2010 (Wallace and Pollack, 2010: pp. 439-488).

However, all of these measures were not adequate for the development of integration within the framework of the European Union. All the events ensured the leading politicians for one more time that important changes in the field of foreign and security policy are necessary. And, these necessities reflected themselves in the Treaty on the European Constitution, and in the Treaty of Lisbon after the rejection of the former in referendums held in France (%55 against) and the Netherlands (%61.6 against) (BBC, 2005).

As it is obvious from the discussions above, the way in which the Treaty of Lisbon shaped was deeply influenced by the political processes of that time, the environment. Therefore, the changes made in the Treat of Lisbon were generated as measures to real problems. These changes mirror the needs of the European Union felt during the years of formulation of the Treaty. Thus, practicability of the changes is very high. These changes can be described as bridging gaps in the EU’s external presence.

Immense structural changes were brought by the Treaty of Lisbon to the external presence of the European Union. To start with, there are top three officials who are the representatives of the European Union in the highest level: the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security policies. However, only two of them – the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission – can represent the EU at the level of heads of states and governments (Piris, 2010, p. 248). The Treaty of Lisbon officialised the European Council which shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, and created the post of the President of the European Council who will take part in the meeting of the European Union together with the President of the Commission; High Representative for Foreign affairs and security policies can participate in these meetings (Article 9 b (2), TEU). The same article states that the President of the European Council ensures the external representation of the Union in the field of foreign and security policy, but without prejudice to the responsibilities of the High Representative. Nevertheless, as Antonio Missiroli notes in one of his articles, the role of the President is not illuminated in the Treaty leaving a lot of questions regarding his role; it is vague whether the appointee should be a ‘President’ or rather a ‘Chairman. His role belonged to the rotating EU Presidency before the Lisbon Treaty (Missiroli, 2010: p. 430).  The columnist of The Economist, Charlemagne discusses the reason of such vagueness in ‘What the EU’s new leaders tell us about Europe’:

“The Lisbon Treaty is pretty vague about the job description of the president of the council, but it does include language about the president representing the EU overseas at his level. Yet as the last few weeks unfolded, it became clear that a majority of countries wanted the president’s post to be entirely inward-looking, with next to no foreign policy role. They wanted someone who did not overshadow national leaders, but acted as a secretary general for their summits” (The Economist, 2009)

The nature of the President, thus, has been left to be shaped in practice. In such a situation, a lot of things regarding the nature of the President depend on the personality of the President and relations between the top three representatives. Albeit, the Treaty does not set the post of the President of the European Council as a stronger official having influence over the heads of state and government of the member states, it also does not make him dependent on the heads of state and governments of the member state. It leaves possibility for extension of the role of the President, an open door from transgovernmentalism towards institutionalism.

More structural changes were made with respect to the nature of the position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policies. In Missiroli’s words, these changes are the cornerstone of the new EU system in the field of external action. According to him, the High Representative is a hybrid institutional figure combining: (a) the initial role of HR for CFSP as set in the Treaty of Amsterdam, (b) that of the Vice President of the Commission in charge of external relations and coordinating other areas of CFSP which is under the authority of other Commissioners, (c) the role played by the Foreign Ministers of the country holding the rotating EU Presidency (Missiroli, 2010, p. 430). The HR also presides over the Foreign Affairs Council (Griller & Ziller, 2008, p. 209). Some amendments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the Article 38 TEU define the nature of relationship between Political and Security Committee and the High Representative where some authority of the Council over the PSC is shared with the High Representative. Firstly, like the Council, the HR can request opinions from the PSC. Moreover, the PSC should implement its responsibilities without prejudice to the powers of the HR. Besides, while implementing its responsibilities in the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations, the PSC is under the responsibility of both the Council and the HR. Finally, the Chairman of the PSC is a representative of the HR (Piris, 2010, p. 247).

As the Article 9E (2) sets, the HR is appointed by the European Council acting by qualified majority voting, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, and his field of action does not cover all areas of external relations and is limited to only common CFSP and CSDP. But, according to the same article, he is also responsible for ‘the consistency of the Union’s external action’ by ‘coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action. That is the role of the HR played as the Vice President of the Commission. There are six other Vice Presidents in the Commission. Nonetheless, the High Representative Catherine Ashton differentiates from them as the most senior, since she also participates in the meeting of the European Council (Missiroli, 2010: p. 433). In the Treaty of Lisbon, Commission delegations renamed as EU delegations and are responsible to the High Representatives (European Parliament, 2009). Besides being a structural change, it is also authoritative change which makes the HR more powerful in implementing its responsibilities. With all his faces, the HR is only capable of making proposals, but not decision (Article 9E & Article 13 A, TEU). Again, final decisions left for the European Council. However, with all pros and cons, the incorporation of the role of by the Commissioner for External Relation, the role of the Foreign Ministers of the country holding the rotating EU Presidency and that of played by the Vice President of the Commission who is responsible for coordination of external actions, and separation of Foreign Affairs Council from General Affairs Council will bring more coherence and consistency into the external action of the European Union. The Ex-President of the Republic of France and a member of Constitutional Council of France, centre-right politician Valéry Giscard d’Estaing evaluate the changes introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon in this way:

“It would end the duplication that exists between the current function of M. Javier Solana, and that provided in the Commission by Ms. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, responsible for external assistance of the European Union. A single person and treat the problems and meet to the famous phone calls of Henry Kissinger: “I want to talk to Europe” (Le blog de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 2007).

In his post, the HR is supported by the European External Action Service which comprises staff from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as from national diplomatic services of the Member States as set in Article 13A, TEU. However, the organization and functioning of the External Action Service are not determined in the Treaty of Lisbon. Instead, the Treaty of Lisbon authorizes the Council to adopt a decision on these matters. But, according to the same article, the Council must act ‘on a proposal by the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission (Article 13A (3), TEU). Such a decision has been made on 26 July 2010 (Council Decision, 2010).

Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and before the Lisbon Treaty the High Representative was assisted by a Deputy Secretary-General as the High Representative was also the Secretary-General of the Council. Directorate General E which is in charge of External relation, the Policy Unit, the Situation Centre and the EU Military Staff (Piris, 2010, p. 249-250). The importance of the changes is that after the Lisbon Treaty the institutions supporting the High Representative in his actions are not under the authority of the Council, rather are responsible to the High Representative. Such power can ensure the real independence of the EEAS along with its separate budget from EU institutions.

The other category of changes includes those in foreign and security policy area and procedures. In the Chapter 1 of the TEU inserted by the treaty of Lisbon is on the General Provisions of the EU external actions, the first and the second paragraph of which set principles and objectives of EU external action. Chapter 2 named as ‘Specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy consists of two sections – Common provisions and Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy into the Treaty on European Union. The first article of the Chapter 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon states emphasizes that the Union’s external action is ‘guided by the principles, pursue the objectives of, and be conducted in accordance with, the general provisions’ (Article 10 C, TEU). Besides bringing coherence and coordination into the external actions of the EU institutions, the Treaty of Lisbon provides coherence for the nature of the actions by setting common principles, objectives and general provisions. In terms of bringing coherence, provisions set out in Article 16 of the TEU are very important which considers:

‘Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union’s interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity’

However, the Lisbon Treaty does not determine specific rules and procedures of the CFSP. Instead, it authorizes the European Council and the Council to determine and implement these rules and procedures, except the Treaty provides otherwise (Article 11A, TEU).

With the provisions of Article 47 and 37 of the TEU, the possibility of controversy on the capacity of the EU to conclude international agreements in the domain of CFSP is disappeared. All international agreements are subject to the same procedures for negotiation and conclusion as set in Article 218 TFEU. Article 24 of the former TEU on specific procedures for negotiating and concluding in the area of CFSP was amended. All international agreements concluded by the Union in the domain of Common foreign and Security policy became binding for all member states and EU institutions. Five types of CFSP legal instruments were reduced to one – ‘decisions’ (Piris, 2010, p. 259).

Four of the changes in the area of common security and defence policy carry essential importance: the Solidarity clause, possibility of entrusting a group of Member states with a CSDP mission, the permanent structured co-operation and establishment of the European Defence Agency. Article 28A (3) of the TEU and Article 188R of the TEC define that in        case of terrorist attacks, natural and man-made disasters, and armed aggression on territory of a member state, Member States assist each other. In regard to neutral member states, it was noted that the solidarity clause ‘shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member states (Piris, 2010, p. 275). As set out in Articles 42 and 44 of the TEU, the Council can authorise a group of Member states willing and having the needed capacity to defend EU interests. The Treaty of Lisbon has also created a possibility of ‘permanent structured co-operation between willing members provided meeting high military criteria. Article 1 of the Protocol No. 10 on Permanent Structured Cooperation established by the article of the Treaty on European Union envisages that permanent structured cooperation is open to all of the member states (European Basic Treaties, 2010). Although, the EU does not transform into military union with the Treaty of Lisbon, it creates pre-conditions for that aim.

As mention in the beginning, the Treaty of Lisbon does not bring about complete integration and perfect external EU presence. Rather, it does it to some extent by introducing structural, authoritative, and policy and procedural changes, thus, put the cornerstones and leave open doors for further development. The amendments in the area of external actions to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union made by the Treaty of Lisbon will give rise to stronger external EU presence by ensuring coherence, co-ordination, strong institutional power and solidarity than existing situation. The Lisbon Treaty is an important part of transition from transgovernmentalism to institutionalism, but not sharp turn. The Europe is on the way to a more integrated Union with a common defence agreement and a common coherent position in all external actions. What is needed is time, adequate preparation and favourable environment.

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• the conduct of free and democratic elections
• the respect of the rule of law
• the respect of human rights
• the creation of a true market economy (D.Papadimitriou).

By promising ‘carrots’ and then showing ‘stick’ the EU coerces countries to start economic and democratic reforms. In such situation, countries calculate the cost of ignoring EU promises and accepting it, then, they make their decisions. Since the relationship between the EU and a third country is hierarchical and also when cost of ignoring promises is very high and promises are credible, as usual countries decide to accept those conditions. This kind of coercion is increased after each steps of ‘ladder’ which brings countries each time much closer to the EU. And countries are more prone to influence of the EU. Here are the steps of ‘ladder’: Co-operation and Partnership Agreement, Trade Agreement, Association Agreement, Membership Application. Azerbaijan has signed Co-operation and Partnership Agreement with the EU in 1996.

In the context of increasing political tension in Azerbaijan inspired by revolutions in the Arabs’ world, the EU started to apply this conditionality by promising ‘carrots’ and the showing ‘stick’. The EU, firstly, showed its ‘stick’. This was in different ways. Some newspapers put the picture of the president Ilham Aliyev on their first pages with ‘Despot’ headlines or criticized crashdown over protesters. The OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU openly expressed their concerns about attacks on opposition journalists, arrests of protesters, and pressure on youth activists. Even, the secretary general of the CE stated in his letter to the president that he was ready to visit Azerbaijan to discuss issues mentioned above. Some national MPs of European countries harshly criticized Azeri Government because of use of force against peaceful protesters. The  recently visit of twenty officials of Europe which included ambassadors of some European countries and representatives and delegations of European institutions to the headquarters of Musavat party was the sign of the support to Azeri opposition. Now, the EU is showing its ‘carrots’ by starting negotiation on stabilization and association agreement. Just to give example, the same happened in Macedonia in 2001 during the conflict between Albanian Liberation Army which represented Albanian minority in Macedonia and Macedonian government. The EU signed stabilization and Association agreement in March 2001 when the conflict was in its highest point. But what will happen if Azerbaijan signs the agreement? By signing this agreement, Azerbaijan will move into the sphere of influence of the Union by allowing the EU to judge domestic political situation of the country, and Azeri Government will be more vulnerable to external pressure originating from the EU and its member states. It will be legitimization of external influence. Thus, the EU will be an effective centre of international pressure. Moreover, Western public opinion in domestic politics of Azerbaijan will increase. In this scenario, there will be dilemma between ‘path to Europe’ and interference in domestic politics. Attempts to smooth the pressure by accepting some of conditions will not be successful, as they never were. In other scenario, where the EU fails to affect government the result is not in favour of government again. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier state that even if EU incentives failed to affect an authoritarian government directly, exclusion by the EU signalled to the society in this state that the incumbent government was the main obstacle to their country’s relationship with the EU and these signals will mobilize society against the government. Attempts to change such governments in this way were successful in the Balkans and Slovakia. These are just scenarios. I might be wrong. However, the intention behind the start  or the second round of negotiations is clear – ‘carrots’.
P.S. This is a rule transfer by external incentives. But this mode of rule transfer is not preferable in comparison with other two modes: social learning and lesson-drawing because rules that are transferred through social learning or lesson-drawing are much less contested domestically, and implementation is more likely to result in behavioural rule adoption and sustained compliance (Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier).

Papadimitriou D. 2001. “The EU’s Strategy in Post-Communist Balkans’. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 1(3): 69-94

Schimmelfennig, F., and Sedelmeier, U., 2004. “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe”. Journal of European Public Policy 11:4, 661-679
Seyidaga, Mammadov, F., April, 2011. “Western Coalition Bombarded Official Baku”. Yeni Musavat, Available at: <http://www.musavat.com/new/G%C3%BCnd%C9%99m/98199-S%C6%8FF%C4%B0RL%C6%8FR%C4%B0N_M%C3%9CSAVAT_SAMM%C4%B0T%C4%B0> [Accessed 9 April 2011]

Buradan belə nəticəyə gəlmək olar ki, facebook və digər sosial şəbəkələr ölkənin milli təhlükəsizliyinə təhdid deyil, tam əksi daha demokratik dövlət və ya xalqın hakimiyyət üzərində daha böyük təsir gücünə sahib ola bilməsi üçün yararlı bir platformadır. Bununla yanaşı, hakimiyyət üçün də bu platformada formalaşan fikirlər yeni islahatlar üçün motivasiya və ya ideya mənbəyi ola bilər. İctimai müzakirələrin daha azad şəkildə aparılması, eyni zaman da, hakimiyyətin xalqı daha uğurlu idarə etməsi üçün reflektor kimi faydalı olar.

İlk olaraq Prezident ölkədə həyata keçirilən sosial siyasətdən və sosial vəziyyətdən bəhs etdi, iqtisadiyyatın planlı həyata keçirilməsi  və sosial təminatların artırılmasının vacibliyini vurğuladı:

“Bizim artıq böyük valyuta ehtiyatlarımız var və özümüzü çox rahat və əmin hiss edirik. Bununla bərabər, bütün bu görülmüş işlər onu göstərir ki, planlı şəkildə qurulmuş iş olan yerdə nəticə də olacaqdır. Ancaq biz əldə edilmiş nailiyyətlərlə kifayətlənməməliyik, daha da böyük işlər görməliyik, iqtisadiyyatımızı daha da gücləndirməliyik, sosial siyasəti daha da gücləndirməliyik. Keçən il minimum əməkhaqqı və pensiyanın baza hissəsi artırılmışdır.Azərbaycanda orta əməkhaqqını dollarla hesablasaq, 400 dollardan artıqdır. Ancaq yenə də deyirəm, bu, bizi qane edə bilməz. Bütün səylərimiz ona yönəlməlidir ki, Azərbaycan vətəndaşları daha da yaxşı yaşasınlar. Düzdür, son yeddi ildə yoxsulluğun səviyyəsinin 4 dəfə aşağı düşməsi böyük nəticədir. Təxminən 44 faizdən 9,1 faizə düşməsi görülmüş işlərin nəticəsidir. Amma bu da çoxdur. Son yeddi ildə 900 mindən çox iş yeri açılmışdır ki, onlardan 700 minə qədəri daimi iş yeridir. İşsizliyin böyük hissəsi aradan qaldırılmışdır, amma hələ də işsizlik var.Xüsusilə 2011-ci ildə və ondan sonrakı illərdə biz bu sahələrə xüsusi diqqət göstərəcəyik ki, bütün çatışmayan məsələləri həll edək, çatışmayan cəhətləri aradan qaldıraq. “

Sosial vəziyyətin yaxşılaşmasının vurğulanması, pensiyaların və əmək haqqlarının artırılması, yeni iş yerlərinin açılması və işsizliyin azaldılması və gələcəkdə bu cür tədbirlərin davam etdirilməsi Prezidentin çıxışlarının ənənəvi mövzusudur. Prezidentdən qayğı görmək istəyən sadə daha az gəlirli vətəndaşa ünvanlanmış bir çıxış idi.

Çıxışın ümumi ölkədəki vəziyyəti əhatə edən növbəti hissəsi sahibkarlıqla bağlı idi. Sahibkarlıqdan bəhs edən hissənin ilk beş və son cümləni çıxmaq şərtilə son beş cümləsi ənənəvi mövzuları əhatə edirdi.

İlk beş cümlə:

“Sahibkarlığın inkişafına böyük diqqət göstəriləcək. Azərbaycanda sahibkarlar sinfi formalaşır və mən daim sahibkarlarla görüşürəm. Hətta xarici səfərlərə də özümlə aparıram ki, biz onları beynəlxalq bazarlara çıxaraq. Biz Azərbaycan iş adamlarının beynəlxalq bazarlara çıxması üçün siyasi fəaliyyət də göstəririk. Ölkə daxilində sahibkarlığın inkişafı üçün güzəştli şərtlərlə uzunmüddətli kreditlər, subsidiyalar ayrılır.”

Sonuncu cümləni çıxmaq şərtilə son beş cümlə:

“Azərbaycan öz iqtisadiyyatını tam şəkildə bazar münasibətləri prinsipləri üzərində qurubdur. Bazar iqtisadiyyatının qanunları tələb edir ki, sahibkarlıq sinfi güclənsin. Bizim böyük sənaye müəssisələrimiz var, – neft-qaz sənayesi, digər sənaye müəssisələri. Ancaq ölkəmizin inkişafı üçün sahibkarlığın, orta və kiçik sahibkarlığın inkişafı başlıca şərtdir. Bu məqsədlə biz son illər Sahibkarlığa Kömək Milli Fondunun xətti ilə güzəştli şərtlərlə kreditlər ayırmışıq, vəsait vermişik.”

Ənənəvi çıxışlardan fərqli olaraq bu çıxışında Prezident sahibkarlığın qaşılaşdığı qanun pozuntularına, bürokratiyanın sahibkarlara qarşı törətdiyi soyğunçuluğa və digər qanun pozundularına toxunur və bu cür halların aradan qaldırılması yolunda tədbirlərin görüldüyünü, lakin bunların kifayət etmədiyini vurğulayır. Bundan sonra daha ciddi tədbirlərin görüləcəyinə vəd verir. Bunun üçün siyasi iradənin ortaya qoyulacağına işarə edir:

“Əlbəttə, siyasi dəstək çox vacibdir. Bəzi hallarda xüsusilə sahibkarlara qarşı ədalətsiz hərəkətlərin aradan qaldırılması üçün son zamanlar çox ciddi tədbirlər görülür. Bu tədbirlər mütəmadi qaydada görülür, amma mən hesab edirəm ki, biz bu sahədə səylərimizi daha da gücləndirməliyik. Əsassız müdaxilələrə, lazımsız yoxlamalara son qoyulmalıdır.”

Sahibkarlıqla bağlı çıxışının sonunda bir daha bu sahədə ədalətsizliklərin qarşısının alınacağını və şaffaflığı artırılacağını vurğulayır:

“Bütün bu işləri görmüşük, bununla bərabər, yenə də deyirəm, bütün bu sahələrdə şəffaflıq olmalıdır, ədalət olmalıdır.”

Prezidentin çıxışlarında daha az rast gəlinən hal isə rüşvətxorluq və korrupsiya ilə mübarizədir. Ümumi ölkədəki vəziyyət haqqında çıxışının növbəti hissəsi buna həsr olunmuşdu. Bu cür halları Prezident “yaralar” olaraq təsvir edir. Ənənəvi çıxışıarından fərqli olaraq xalqa müraciət edir və bu cür “yaraların” aradan qaldırılmasında xalqdan kömək istəyir. Bu mübarizənin hələ ilin ilk ayından başladığını vurğulayır:

“Azərbaycanda böyük işlər görülür, hələ çox işlər də görülməlidir. Biz ölkəmizi müasirləşdirməliyik, bütün cəhətlərdən – həm siyasi islahatlar, həm də iqtisadi islahatlar baxımından inkişaf etmiş ölkələrin səviyyəsinə çatdırmalıyıq. Ölkədə ictimai nəzarət daha da güclü olmalıdır, rüşvətxorluğa, korrupsiyaya qarşı mübarizə daha da ciddi aparılmalıdır. Bu məsələlərin həlli ilə bağlı bu ilin əvvəlində Nazirlər Kabinetinin iclasında verdiyim tapşırıqlar yerinə yetirilir.

Mən sizdən və Azərbaycanın bütün vətəndaşlarından xahiş edirəm ki, bütün xoşagəlməz hallar haqqında, bütün ədalətsizliklər haqqında, əsassız tələblər haqqında Prezident Administrasiyasına və digər müvafiq qurumlara, yerli icra hakimiyyəti orqanlarına məlumat versin ki, biz bu nöqsanları, bu yaraları daha da tezliklə aradan qaldıraq. “

Çıxışın növbəti hissəsi daha çox ölkənin seçdiyi inkişaf yolu və ediləcək reformların istiqamətləri və sahələri qeyd edilir, sosial inkişaf və korrupsiya ilə mübarizə bir daha vurğulanır. Yenidən xalqı ona reformlar  və korrupsiya ilə mübarizə yolunda köməyə çağırır, “siyasi rəhbərliyin iradəsinin” bunun üçün kifayət etməyəcəyini bildirir. Bu hissə də Prezidentin ənənvi çıxışlarından kəskin fərqlənir:

“Bizim qarşımızda çox böyük perspektivlər var. Azərbaycan sözün əsl mənasında inkişaf etmiş ölkəyə çevrilməlidir və bu, bizim məqsədimizdir. Mən bu barədə fikirlərimi dəfələrlə bildirmişəm. Baxmayaraq ki, dünyada inkişaf etmiş ölkələrin sayı çox deyil, hesab edirəm, bizim imkanımız var ki, biz bütün meyarlar üzrə o sıraya daxil olaq. Bunu etmək üçün təkcə iqtisadi uğurlar kifayət deyil. Ölkədə gərək bütün sahələr ən yüksək meyarlarla ölçülsün. Sosial təminat, infrastruktur layihələri, sosial ədalət prinsiplərinin bərqərar olması, məhkəmə-hüquq sistemində aparılan islahatlar və ədalətli qərarların çıxarılması, icra orqanlarında şəffaflığın təmin olunması, bütün maliyyə sistemimizdə şəffaflığın maksimum dərəcədə təmin olunması, ictimai nəzarət, demokratiyanın inkişafı – yəni inkişaf etmiş ölkələr bax bu sahələrdəki uğurlar hesabına inkişaf etmiş ölkələr hesab olunur.

Biz də bu yolla getməliyik, başqa yolumuz yoxdur. Bunu etmək üçün əlbəttə ki, təkcə rəhbərliyin siyasi iradəsi kifayət etməz. Burada bütün ictimaiyyət, bütün vətəndaşlar bir olmalıdırlar. Biz bir məqsədə qulluq etməliyik ki, ölkəmiz inkişaf etsin, güclənsin, sosial rifah daha da yüksək səviyyədə olsun, iqtisadiyyat daha da möhkəm olsun. Belə olan halda uzunmüddətli inkişaf strategiyamız öz nəticəsini verəcəkdir.”

Maraqlı məqam isə “sosial”, “ədalət” və ya “ədalətsizlik” (5), “inkişaf” sözlərinin dəfələrlə işlədilməsidir. “Sosial” sözü çıxışda 9 dəfə işlədilmişdir. Bunların içində əsas əhəmiyyətli olanları “sosial siyasət”, “sosial ədalət”, “sosial rifah”, “sosial təminat” və “sosial məsələlər” anlayışlarının işlədilməsidir. “Sosial ədalət” ifadəsi Prezident tərəfindən çox işlədilmir.

Bu çıxışdan xalqa bir neçə mesaj göndərildiyini görmək olar:

1. Sosial vəziyyətin yaxşılaşdırılmasına davam ediləcək.

2. Sahibkarlığın qarşılaşdığı qanun pozuntuları, müdaxilələr və korrupsiya ilə mübarizə gücləndiriləcək

3. Dövlətin müxtəlif sahələrində islahatlar aparılacaq.

4.İnkişaf etmiş dövlətə çevrilməyin yolu sosial, azad iqtisadiyyata sahib, demokratik dövlət quruculuğundan keçir.

5. Reformların həyata keçirilməsi və korrupsiya ilə mübarizədə xalqın dəstəyinə prezidentin ehtiyacı var, siyasi rəhbərliyin iradəsi kifayət deyildir.

Prezidentin bu beş cümlədə sadələşdirilmiş  mesajları Yaxın və Orta Şərqdə baş verən siyasi hadisələr, Misir və Tunis inqilabları dövrünə təsadüf edir. Dəfələrlə ictimaiyyətin müxtəlif kəsimlərindən Misirdəki və ya Tunisdəki kimi sosial partlayışların yaşanmaması üçün hakimiyyəti reformlar keçirməyə çağırışlar olmuşdur. Müxalifətdə də belə görünür ki, bu ilə fəallıq müşahidə olunacaqdır. Bu il Musavat partiyasının yaranmasının 100 illiyidir. Bu da sözsüz ki hadisələrə təsirsiz qalmayacaqdır. Ölkədəki siyasi vəziyyət əvvəlki illərlə müqayisədə daha da aktivləşməkdədir. Milliyətçi kəsimin iki əsgərimizin şəhid olması ilə qabardılması (Prezidentin ilk dəfə əsgər dəfninə qatılması), namizədlərin biabırçı çıxışları və parlament seçkiləri, parlament seçkiləri dönəmində sakitliyi tərcih edən OL hərəkatının liderlərinin – Emin Milli və Adnan Hacızadənin azadlığa buraxılması, hicab məsələsi, dindarların mitinqləri, nəticədə dini rəhbərlərin həbsləri, bu zəmində İranla münasibətlərin pozulması, WikiLeaks-in Azərbaycanın üç “böyük” ailəsi haqda açıqlamaları, Facebook-da yazdığı statusunda Misirdəki inqilabdan təsirlənib insanları küçəyə çağıran 20 yaşlı gəncin həbs edilməsi (indikator kimi istifadə edildiyini düşünürəm), Məmməd Əmin Rəsulzadənin doğum gününün əvvəlki illərlə münasibətdə daha da təmtəraqlı keçirilməsi kimi prosesləri qısa bir dönəmdə sakitliyə alışmış Azərbaycan xalqının yaşaması və ardınca İslam aləmində inqilablar – sosial partlayışlar Azərbaycanın da bu proseslərinin axınına yaxın günlərdə qatılacağını göstərir. Politoloqların çağırışları və Prezidentin bu cür mesajları bunu bir daha təsdiq edir.

Bu günkü vəziyyətdə doğru olan, vətəndaşların Prezidentin çağrışına cavab vermələri, bütün qanun pozuntusu, korrupsiya, rüşvət və başqa xoşa gəlməz halların Prezident Administrasiyasina bildirilməsi və ictimai müzakirəyə çıxarılması, belə hallara rəvac verən şəxslərin ictimai qınağa tutulması, hakimiyyətin isə çəkinmədən cəsarətli addımlarla reformlara start verməsi, öz-özünü “çürük almalar”dan təmizləməsi və həqiqi sosial yönümlü, azad bazar iqtisadiyyatına sahib, demokratik, qanunun işlədiyi bir dövlətin qurulması yolunda addımların atmasıdır. Politoloq Vəfa Quluzadənin Azadlıq Radiosina müsahibəsində bildirir ki, biz də Misir və Tunis xalqının əziyyət və cəsarətindən qazanclı çıxa bilərik. Artıq şərq ölkələri başa düşürlər ki reformların vaxtıdır. Bizim ölkə də əgər sosial partlayış aqibətinə düçar olmaq istəmirsə, reformlara başlamalıdır.

 Prezident bu reformlar zamanı, sözsüz ki,  həm bürokratiyadan və həm də biznes mühitindən (hərçənd ki bunlar bizdə birləşiblər) dirənişlərlə qarşılaşacaq. Bu dirənişləri məğlub etmək üçün xalqın reform üçün təyziqini Prezidentin arxasına alaması vacibdir. Bunun üçün hər birimiz vətəndaş olaraq Prezidentin çağrışına cavab verməli, bütün xoşa gəlməz halları şikayət etməli, reformlar üçün maksimum təyziq göstərməliyik. Bu bizim üçün tarixi şansdır. Bu şansı qaçırmamalıyıq. Hakimiyyət isə vədlərində səmimi olmalıdır. Əks halda gec və ya tez eynilə Misirdəki sosial partlayışla qarşılaşacaq.

Mənbə: http://www.president.az/articles/1542/images?locale=en

Nəsibbeyli

Zərrə zərrə qram qram

Qolumdakı zəncirləri

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